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Robert P. Mosteller* 
 
Fabricated testimony by informants often plays an important role in 
convictions of the innocent.  In this article, I examine the particularly 
problematic situation of defendants who are innocent of the particular 
crime charged but are not strangers to crime.  As to such defendants, 
potential informants abound among crime associates, and they have a 
ready story line that authorities are preconditioned to accept.  
Independent proof, which could be an antidote, will predictably be 
lacking.  Indeed, that the informant has exclusive, critical knowledge 
often leads the prosecution to offer particularly tempting deals.  
I focus on the case of Lee Wayne Hunt, a likely innocent man 
condemned to spend his life in a North Carolina prison.  Hunt, who was 
the head of a local marijuana distribution ring, was convicted of 
apparently drug-related murders exclusively by the testimony of 
informants.  The strong reason to believe he is innocent comes from 
confession of sole guilt by an alleged co-participant made to his lawyer 
before his own trial for the murders, a confidential communication 
revealed only after the client’s suicide.  Remarkably, relief has been 
refused.  
To reduce the dangers of fabricated informant testimony, I propose 
requiring the recording of “first drafts” of informant stories and 
documenting the full extent of promises made or assumed.  Procedures 
should also be developed for independent prosecutorial review before 
trial in all cases that depend critically on informant testimony and for 
independent review of such cases after conviction when facially credible 
claims are made that would establish a reasonable likelihood of 
innocence if substantiated. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
*   Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.  I would like to thank Cindy 
Adcock, Sara Beale, Doug Berman, Stephanos Bibas, John Blume, Ken Broun, Darryl Brown, Mike 
Cassidy, Jennifer Collins, Sharon Davies, Paul Giannelli, Bruce Green, Staples Hughes, Alan 
Michaels, Daniel Mosteller, Richard Myers, Theresa Newman, Jeff Powell, Rich Rosen, Vic Streib, 
Kami Simmons, Ric Simmons, Andy Taslitz, Ron Wright, and Ellen Yaroshefsky for comments on 
an earlier draft. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139121
 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 6:519 
 
520
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Duke Lacrosse Case and the disbarment of the Durham District Attorney 
Mike Nifong occupied media attention for over a year from the spring of 2006 
until the summer of 2007.  As I have written, the prosecution was a fiasco,1 but in 
the end, justice was done.  North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper not only 
dismissed charges but also declared the three players who had been charged with 
rape innocent, and the North Carolina State Bar disbarred the prosecutor for his 
misconduct.2 
Unfortunately, Lee Wayne Hunt’s case, which received far less national 
press,3 has not reached a similarly just result in my judgment.  Hunt was tried for 
his life in 1986 for the murder of Roland and Lisa Matthews, which he allegedly 
masterminded and committed with three other individuals.  He was convicted of 
two counts of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.  While spared 
the death penalty, he remains in prison serving two consecutive life terms plus 
twenty years.4 
According to evidence recently revealed by the former defense attorney for 
Jerry Dale Cashwell, an alleged co-participant who was convicted in a separate 
trial for the murders and committed suicide in 2002 while in prison, Hunt is 
innocent.  That attorney, Staples Hughes, who is presently the Appellate Defender 
for the State of North Carolina, has testified that Cashwell admitted to his solitary 
guilt in a conversation with Hughes and his co-counsel soon after his arrest for the 
murders, repeating and never contradicting that account throughout the 
representation even though his account was extremely damaging to defense efforts. 
                                                                                                                                                   
1   Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A 
Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice,” 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1337 (2007) (quoting F. Lane 
Williamson, chair of the Disciplinary Hearing Commission panel). 
2   I have discussed the Duke Lacrosse Case in connection with other recent North Carolina 
prosecutions, which showed the importance of full open-file discovery to correcting injustices in 
death penalty cases and in producing the dismissal of the Duke Lacrosse Case.  See Robert P. 
Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The 
Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257 (2008). 
3   In a report that aired on CBS 60 Minutes in November 2007, Hunt’s case was highlighted 
for the misuse of forensic evidence that has been shown to be invalid.  See 60 Minutes: Evidence of 
Injustice (CBS television broadcast Nov. 18, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 22912469.  Now 
repudiated scientific evidence was admitted that allegedly linked the bullets that killed the victims on 
the basis of their composition to a box of ammunition obtained from Jerry Cashwell, which indirectly 
corroborated the prosecution’s case.  Id.  In Hunt’s post-conviction challenge to his conviction, the 
State stipulated that the testimony offered at trial “can no longer be scientifically supported and relied 
upon.”  See Stipulation, at 2, Amendment to Motion for Appropriate Relief, State v. Hunt, 85 CRS 
16651-54 (Jan. 8, 2007) (on file with author).  I do not focus on this questionable evidence because, 
regardless of its accuracy, it provided no direct link to Hunt and is fully consistent with Cashwell’s 
sole responsibility for the crime. 
4   Motion for Appropriate Relief, at 3, State v. Hunt, 85 CRS 16651-54 (Dec. 30, 2004) 
[hereinafter Hunt MAR] (on file with author). 
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Hughes revealed this information to Hunt’s lawyers only after Cashwell 
committed suicide and developments both in the Rules of Professional 
Responsibility and in the North Carolina Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
attorney-client privilege provided potential grounds for both revealing the 
information and admitting it in evidence.  Nevertheless, the trial court that heard 
Hunt’s motion for a new trial denied relief.  Indeed, it refused even to consider 
Hughes’ testimony and moreover reported him to the North Carolina State Bar for 
an ethics violation in disclosing the former client’s secret.  The North Carolina 
appellate courts declined review of the denial of relief to Hunt and to the important 
legal issue of whether the attorney-client privilege barred receiving this 
exculpatory evidence from a deceased client. 
I am convinced of Hunt’s innocence,5 and I question both the failure of the 
North Carolina Attorney General’s Office to undertake an independent review to 
assess carefully the possibility of Hunt’s innocence in the wake of Hughes’ 
disclosure and the refusal of the appellate courts in North Carolina to review the 
trial court’s rulings.  The Attorney General’s Office admirably and effectively 
undertook a review in the Duke Lacrosse Case to investigate potential injustice, 
but it appeared interested only in thwarting inquiry into possible error in Hunt’s 
case.  The North Carolina Supreme Court’s failure to rule on whether the trial 
court’s refusal to receive Hughes’ testimony was justified is equally puzzling and 
particularly unfortunate since that court has the responsibility to declare major 
                                                                                                                                                   
5   My personal conviction, which need affect no one else, is based on two points.  First, my 
careful examination of the record demonstrates to me that the there is no competent evidence outside 
of two informants’ testimony to link Hunt to the murder, and the statement of one of those informants 
is not directly incriminating.  Second and more importantly, I know and respect Staples Hughes.  No 
human is a lie detector, but Hughes is a savvy seasoned defense attorney.  He has seen the worst in 
humanity, and when it comes to the conduct and motivation of criminal defendants, he is nobody’s 
fool.  As he stated in his letter to the North Carolina State Bar when an ethics charge was raised 
against him: 
I now have been a criminal defense lawyer for over twenty-five years.  I am not given to 
illusions about the capacity of human beings for evil.  I understand that motivation and 
behavior can be complex and tangled.  I know that people lie.  At this point, more than 
twenty years after Jerry’s initial disclosure, I believe and know that Lee Wayne Hunt is 
an innocent man. 
Letter from Staples Hughes to Margaret T. Coultier, Staff Attorney, North Carolina State Bar, at 4 
(Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Hughes Response Letter] (on file with author). 
Hughes is convinced to a moral certainty that his client’s statement to him of his sole 
involvement was absolutely true.  It was confirmed by all he saw in the case and was contradicted by 
nothing.  He has thought of this case thousands of times in the intervening years.  Hughes repeatedly 
turned in his mind to the Hunt because he was convinced of the injustice to a man whom he 
recognizes to be no angel but was uninvolved in these murders.  To the skeptic, I suggest one read the 
North Carolina Supreme Court opinion affirming Hunt’s conviction, looking for incriminating 
evidence.  See State v. Hunt, 381 S.E.2d 453 (N.C. 1989).  The incriminating evidence is 
extraordinarily unimpressive, and it is completely clear that there is no independent evidence of guilt 
beyond informers’ testimony and indeed little beyond the testimony of one man, Gene Williford, Jr., 
who was given total immunity for his testimony for clear criminal conduct independent of anything 
implicating Hunt.  
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developments in the law, which the legality of this revelation clearly represents.  
Hopefully, some other body will carefully examine the facts and if merited, as I 
believe, correct the injustice of Hunt’s continued imprisonment.   
Although this essay focuses principally only on the facts of one case, that of 
Lee Wayne Hunt, the reader should view the facts as more universal because they 
present a classic example of one of the most difficult and dangerous situations for 
wrongful convictions.  That is the situation of a defendant who is, or may be, 
innocent of the particular charged crime, but who lacks general innocence in 
having some past or present involvement in crime,6 and who is accused only by 
informants whose testimony is secured by the prosecutor’s powerful promises, 
typically of freedom in exchange for incriminating testimony. 
The Duke Lacrosse Case stands in stark contrast.  But for tawdry behavior in 
hiring strippers for a team party and for minor infractions, the defendants were not 
only innocent of the charges brought against them but also young men with basic 
innocence.  The charged players were clearly all strangers to the world of serious 
criminal conduct.  Potentially more importantly, the other team members and their 
friends were also young men of basic innocence. 
Why those who manifest general innocence differ from Lee Wayne Hunt’s 
prosecution and conviction revolves around one type of evidence in the 
prosecution’s arsenal: informants.7  Their absence in one prosecution and presence 
in the other is one of the important divides between the two cases and explains 
much about the gulf between outcomes.   
In this discussion of “incentivized witnesses,” I will uniformly use the term 
informants rather than the more colloquial and sometimes more appropriate term 
“snitches.”  I do that purposefully.  This “bought” testimony is undeniably 
problematic and troubling.8  However, I believe that “snitch,” though sometimes 
                                                                                                                                                   
6   Scholars are beginning to note that miscarriages involving innocence is most likely among 
those who lack generic innocence.  Professor Josh Bowers laid out why arrest bias, charging bias, 
dismissal aversion, and trial biases against the “usual suspects” are far more likely to produce 
convictions among those with substantial contacts with law enforcement—colorfully terms the “usual 
suspect” than among those that are strangers to criminal conduct.  See Josh Bowers, Convicting the 
Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1124–32 (2008).  Professor John Blume has written more 
specifically about the impact of the threat of impeachment with their prior convictions on the type of 
defendants that I focus on here—a threat that frequently causes such defendants not to testify and 
contributes to their wrongful convictions.  See John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal 
Defendant with a Prior Record: Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
477 (2008). 
7   I use the term informant relatively broadly to include those who receive benefits for their 
testimony.  Some authors create other distinctions.  See, e.g., Michael A. Simons, Retribution for 
Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (2003) (distinguishing 
informants who typically provide information for financial compensation from cooperating witness, 
who are involved individuals who receive leniency with regard to their criminal involvement).  
8   In this article, I principally focus on the incentive of leniency.  Sometimes, however, the 
testimony of the informant is “bought” with cash as occurred in the conviction of Levon “Bo” Jones, 
who was released in May 2008 when charges were dismissed after spending thirteen years on North 
Carolina’s death row.  See Mandy Locke, Death Row Inmate to Go Free, NEWS & OBSERVER 
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appropriate, lacks a sense of reality.  Incentivized witnesses sometimes/often tell 
the complete truth, and they are important to many just outcomes.  Although the 
criminal justice system likely relies too heavily on informants, I have no proposal 
to remove them from the system, doubt such a proposal is reasonable, and know it 
is not realistic. 
The evidence that convicted Hunt—the only real evidence of guilt—came 
from a group of informants, which numbered between two and four.  The principal 
evidence came from another alleged co-participant in the crime, Gene Williford, 
Jr., who received full immunity not only for the alleged murders, but significantly 
for numerous other independent crimes for which he faced prosecution.  Another 
informant, Jeffrey Dale Goodman, came from the particularly suspect category of 
“jailhouse informants.”9  He testified to statements made to him by Hunt that, if 
accurate, demonstrated Hunt’s substantial knowledge of the crime from which 
guilt could strongly be inferred, but Goodman never claimed that Hunt directly 
acknowledged his personal involvement.10  The testimony of another jailhouse 
informant, Samuel Thompson, was admitted despite the fact that he never claimed 
that Hunt talked to him and instead only claimed to have talked to Cashwell while 
in jail with him.  Thompson’s testimony was received under a theory of 
impeaching Cashwell’s admissions of solitary guilt that Hunt offered in his trial.11   
Although the jury heard none of his testimony, a fourth informant, Kenneth 
West, should be acknowledged since I argue Hunt’s innocence.  West, the fourth 
alleged co-participant, entered a combination of “no contest” pleas and guilty pleas 
to accessory after the fact to murder in exchange for a sworn proffer of evidence 
and an agreement to testify in post-conviction proceedings.  His version of the 
                                                                                                                            
(Raleigh), May 2, 2008, at A1.  The informant repudiated her trial testimony, stating that “much of 
what [she] testified to . . . was told to [her]” by a member of the sheriff’s office.  Affidavit of Lovely 
Lorden at 3, State v. Jones, 02 CRS 4389–91 (Dec. 5, 2007) (on file with author).  This same law 
enforcement officer delivered a reward of $4,000 to the informant after the completion of her 
testimony, and the informant stated that she knew of this reward before trial.  Id.  See also Shaila 
Dewan, Releases from Death Row Raise Doubts Over Quality of Defense, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2008, 
at A1, A17 (noting that Lorden was a frequent police informant and that the knowledge of the reward 
before trial was not disclosed in testimony at trial).   
9   This concept is discussed later in the essay, see infra Part III.C.3.a.  The classic jailhouse 
informant gives testimony along the following basic lines: “I had nothing to do with the crime.  I just 
happened to be in the cell with the defendant and he said that he ‘robbed the First National Bank.’” 
This class of informants is distinguished from other informants in my judgment as a matter of degree.  
However, they are generally different from co-participant informants in that they (1) do not admit 
criminal responsibility; (2) are potentially numerous because they include everyone who plausibly 
had a conversation with the defendant; (3) usually make the first contact the authorities to peddle 
their information; and (4) are in jail and have the obvious incentive of gaining their release.  
10  See Hunt, 381 S.E.2d at 456 (describing the testimony of Jeffrey Dale Goodman). 
11  Id. (describing the testimony of Samuel Thompson offered in rebuttal that related what 
Cashwell told him about the involvement of Cashwell, Hunt, and a third person, Kenneth West, in the 
murders). 
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facts, while significantly different than the State’s star witness, Williford, clearly 
implicated Hunt in the murders.   
The incentives given to all four witnesses were quite substantial, and liberty 
for each was achieved immediately or within short order.  One, Williford, was 
released on bond immediately upon reaching an agreement to testify and served no 
more time; the two jailhouse informants were released within three months of their 
testimony; and the fourth, West, faced a maximum of two weeks in jail once his 
agreement was reached and plea entered.12  
Of course, one might say that no informants offered evidence against the 
Duke Lacrosse defendants because the charged players were not guilty.  However, 
innocent defendants and incriminating informants are not incompatible when the 
informants give false testimony, and the innocent and informants are hardly 
strangers in documented cases of injustice.  Examination of the causes of error in 
the first two hundred DNA exonerations shows that false informant testimony was 
involved in eighteen percent of those cases.13  Clearly, the fact the Duke Lacrosse 
defendants were innocent made it far less likely there would be informant 
testimony.  It no doubt also helped that no rape, indeed no sex, took place, and the 
allegations were based on either a hoax or a delusion.  However, probably more 
important was that none of the other individuals who were in a position to claim to 
have at the party “seen something” supporting the rape or to have later heard an 
incriminating statement from the defendants had any, let alone substantial, criminal 
                                                                                                                                                   
12  Under the agreement, West received a three-year sentence and was given 447 days credit 
for time already served against the sentence.  His sentence was to be served in the Cumberland 
County jail, a local facility.  See Transcript of Guilty Plea and Judgment of Proceedings at 7, 15, 
State v. West, 85 CRS 16643–44, 87 CRS 6442–43 (Feb. 26, 1987) [hereinafter West Tr.] (on file 
with author).  The Department of Corrections has no record that West served any time under the 
three-year sentence, likely because it was to be served locally.  Unfortunately, Cumberland County 
jail records do not exist for that period of time.  Thus, no records show his actual date of release. 
West was likely immediately eligible for community service parole.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
15A-1380.2(h) (2007).  At most, he was in jail a little less than two weeks after this plea was entered.  
On March 11, 1987, legislation to reduce overcrowding in North Carolina prisons and jails became 
effective, which required that prisoners both be paroled and supervision simultaneously terminated 
270 days before the end of the maximum sentence.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1380.2(c) (2007).  
With time-served credit and with “credit for good behavior” reducing his maximum term one day for 
every day served without major infraction, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.7(b) (2007), West had to 
be released when that legislation became effective less than two weeks after his plea and sentencing.  
Samuel Thompson’s experience of parole within three months with less time served on a similar 
three-year sentence, see infra note 83 and accompanying text, confirms this calculation. 
13  See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 76, 87–88 (2008).  See 
also BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT 
RIGHT 246 (2001) (finding informants involved in twenty-one percent of the sixty-two exonerations 
examined); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989–2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 543 (2005) (describing the role of false testimony by both those who claimed 
involvement in the crime and by others who did not, chiefly jailhouse informants).  Erroneous 
eyewitness testimony was found in the largest number of cases.  See Garrett, supra, at 76 (finding 
erroneous eyewitness testimony in 77 percent of the cases); see also, SCHECK ET AL., supra, at 361 
(finding such testimony in over 80 percent of the cases). 
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law exposure that the police and/or prosecution could hold over them or use as 
strong inducements.  As examined briefly in Part I, the approximately forty other 
men at the party were potential alibi witnesses for the three indicted players; they 
would have been potential informants if the three had, like Hunt, associated with 
criminally exposed individuals. 
After setting up a contrast with true innocents in the Duke Lacrosse Case in 
Part II, I examine the Hunt prosecution and its weaknesses in Part III along with 
Staples Hughes’ disclosure of his client’s confession of solitary guilt that 
completely exculpates Hunt.  In Part IV, I set out some of the lessons learned about 
the abuses of informants and their role in convicting the innocent.  In Part V, I 
examine the major reforms that have been proposed.  In Part VI, I propose a set of 
four central components of the remedy to the abuses of informants.  The first two 
are procedural proposals that concretely fulfill constitutional disclosure 
responsibilities that the Supreme Court has imposed on the prosecution but 
currently are frequently unsatisfied because the information is inaccessible.  The 
evidence produced by these requirements will provide the jury with a better basis 
to determine the truth and protect the innocent.  The final two are proposals first 
for pre-trial internal but independent prosecutorial re-evaluation of the prospect of 
innocence and post-trial when new information supporting innocence comes to the 
prosecution in those cases where informants provide the only direct evidence of 
guilt.  
 
II. INFORMANTS THAT WEREN’T: THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE, WITH NO CRIME 
AND NO LEVERAGE 
 
The Duke Lacrosse Case began with the fateful decision to hire two “exotic 
dancers” for the 2006 Lacrosse team party held at a house near Duke’s East 
Campus where three of the captains lived, including one of the men ultimately 
charged.  Approximately forty others, most but not all of whom were Lacrosse 
team members, attended the party.  The dancers arrived at the house shortly before 
midnight, received payment, and after a short period of dancing, the performance 
ended unhappily and the dancers left to an exchange of taunts. 
Police first came in contact with the alleged victim, Crystal Mangum, in 
response to a 9-1-1 call regarding her condition and found her passed out in the 
other dancer’s car.  She was taken to an organization that offers assistance for 
substance abuse where Mangum stated that she had been raped, and a criminal 
investigation began.14  However, the real turning point came when Durham County 
District Attorney Michael B. Nifong became personally involved in the case.  
Probably for political benefit in a closely contested primary for election, he chose 
to publicize the case and push the prosecution with great zeal.15 
                                                                                                                                                   
14  See Mosteller, supra note 1, at 1342–46. 
15  Id. at 1348–57. 
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The exact nature of Nifong’s motivation is of no consequence to this essay, 
but the great intensity of his interest is.  He vigorously pursued the prosecution, 
and it is clear that he would have obtained incriminating evidence from those at the 
party and those with close contact with team members if he could have done so.  
Indeed, a major component of his publicity blitz was explicitly an effort to secure 
testimony of an insider: 
 
There are three people who went into the bathroom with the young lady, 
and whether the other people there knew what was going on at the time, 
they do now and have not come forward.  I’m disappointed that no one 
has been enough of a man to come forward. . . .16 
My guess is that some of this stonewall of silence that we have seen 
may tend to crumble once charges start to come out.17 
 
Moreover, the prosecution appears not to have been above putting pressure on 
witnesses.  This is shown by the arrest of the cab driver who provided a ride and 
therefore an alibi to Reade Seligmann when he left the Lacrosse party relatively 
early and apparently before the time of the alleged rape.  After the defense 
presented the prosecution with the cab driver’s affidavit supporting Seligmann’s 
alibi defense, the cab driver, Moezeldin Elmostafa, was arrested on a three-year 
old warrant for shoplifting.  While Nifong denied that he was doing anything other 
than following standard practice of checking all witnesses for warrants,18 the arrest 
gave the opportunity for pressuring this witness.  
The members of the Duke Lacrosse team had only minor contacts with the 
law before the rape allegations.  Over the previous three years, sixteen of the 
players on the team had been charged in local courts with minor alcohol and 
disorderly conduct offenses, which included public urination, underage possession 
of alcohol, and helping a minor get a mixed drink.19  These minor offenses 
                                                                                                                                                   
16  Amended Complaint, para. 19, at 3, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DC 35, Disciplinary 
Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar (Jan. 24, 2007) (on file with author); Viv Bernstein & Joe 
Drape, Rape Allegation Against Athletes Is Roiling Duke, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at A1. 
17  Amended Complaint, supra note 16, para. 16, at 3; Nifong Bar Stipulation, para. 16, N.C. 
State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DC 35, Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar (June 12, 
2007) (on file with author); Darla Miles, DA: Alleged Rape May Have Racial Angle (ABC 11 TV 
News broadcast Mar. 27, 2006). available at http://abclocal.go.com/wtvd/story?socal&id=4029749. 
18  See Samiha Khanna, Joseph Neff & Benjamin Niolet, Arrest No Ploy, DA Says, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh), May 12, 2006, at B1.  The case was taken to trial, and Elmostafa was acquitted.  
See Benjamin Niolet, Cabbie in Lacrosse Case Acquitted in Shoplifting, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh), Aug. 30, 2006, at B3.  Kim Pittman, the second dancer, was also arrested on a probation 
violation immediately after she gave a statement to investigators.  See Benjamin Niolet & Joseph 
Neff, Rape Case Witness Has Court Date, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Aug. 15, 2006, at B1.  
19  In addition, one of the defendants, Collin Finnerty, had been arrested the preceding fall in 
Washington, D.C. on simple assault charges.  See Jim Nesbitt, Benjamin Niolet & Lorenzo Perez, 
Team Has Swaggered For Years, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Apr. 9, 2006, at A1. 
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provided no real leverage to coerce cooperation and certainly not enough to tempt 
anyone to perjure himself by incriminating one of the charged players.  
Moreover, many, if not all, of the players relatively quickly acquired 
assistance of defense counsel, albeit joint representation in some cases.20  In any 
case, no one who attended the party apparently ever told the police that he had 
witnessed criminal or questionable behavior, and no teammate, friend, or associate 
of the three charged players ever stated that any of them made even arguably 
incriminating statements.  Finally, because the defendants were released 
immediately on bond, there was no opportunity for an unattached jailhouse 
informant to claim to have heard an admission by one of them. 
As a result of the players’ general innocence and lack of association with 
those involved in crime, there were no informants’ claims to help sustain the case 
when questions grew about the charges and physical evidence not only failed to 
incriminate but revealed foreign DNA that supported exoneration,21 and it totally 
collapsed under independent scrutiny of the Attorney General’s review.  In this 
way, as in many others, the Duke Lacrosse case was atypical.  The Hunt 
prosecution to which I now turn is much closer to the norm of prosecutions 
involving the innocent both in their criminal history22 and the fact that DNA 
evidence is not available for potential proof of innocence.23  Moreover, I suggest it 
is the paradigmatic case for the special dangers of informants to innocent 
defendants because they are not innocents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
20  See, e.g., Letter from Robert C. Ekstrand, Attorney, to Michael B. Nifong, Durham County 
Dist. Attorney at 1–3 (Apr. 6, 2006), Exhibit 206, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DC 35, 
Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar (on file with author) (indicating that Ekstrand 
represents thirty-three of the players). 
21  See Mosteller, supra note 2, at 288–89 (describing the foreign DNA as only supporting 
rather than proving innocence because of its ambiguous character and its failure to identify any other 
potential suspects for the specific conduct charged). 
22  For example, of the twenty-eight DNA exonerations first examined by the National 
Institute of Justice, the police knew over half the defendants, generally through their prior criminal 
records.  See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED 
BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 14 (1996).  
See also Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit 
the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1352 n.124 (1997) (examining this dimension of the 
report). 
23  See Garrett, supra note 13, at 73 (noting that unsurprisingly 70 percent of the first 200 
cases of exoneration were rape cases because biological material is particularly likely in those cases).  
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III. INFORMANTS THAT WERE: THE LEE WAYNE HUNT CASE WITH PAST CRIMES 
AND LEVERAGE FOR A DOUBLE MURDER CONVICTION 
 
A. The Crime, the Incriminating Informant Testimony and Evidence, and the Hunt 
Prosecution 
 
On March 7, 1984, Roland “Tadpole” Matthews and his wife Lisa were found 
dead in their home in Fayetteville, North Carolina, with their two-year-old child 
unharmed in a bedroom.  Both victims had been shot and stabbed.24  The record is 
not clear exactly why, but Jerry Cashwell and Lee Wayne Hunt were quickly 
identified as suspects in the murders.  Their fingerprints were submitted less than a 
week after the murders for comparison with prints lifted at the crime scene, but 
they did not match.25 
We know that Hunt ran a marijuana distribution ring.  At trial, Gene Williford 
testified that Hunt was in charge of a drug operation in that area.26  Hunt 
acknowledges as much.27  It is clear that Cashwell directly participated in this 
operation, and Kenneth West, a next door neighbor to Hunt, and Williford had 
some involvement.  The victims, Roland and Lisa Matthews, also had contact with 
the group.  
A few months after the murder, a newspaper article suggested the reason for 
the focus on Hunt and Cashwell.  The article indicated that investigators believed 
the murder was related to the Matthews’ involvement in drugs and stated that the 
community believed the murders were tied to a drug group in an area of East 
Fayetteville “off Sapona Road.”28  Another newspaper article describing the arrest 
of Hunt, Cashwell, and West, stated Hunt lived “near . . . Sapona Road” and 
further stated that the area was known as “‘Ft. Apache’ by neighbors and law 
officers.”29  The “Fort Apache” reference was apparently to lawlessness, to the 
high fence constructed around Hunt’s home and that of some of his relatives,30 and 
                                                                                                                                                   
24  See State v. Cashwell, 369 S.E.2d 566, 567 (N.C. 1988); see also Hunt, 381 S.E.2d at 455. 
25  See Hunt MAR, supra note 4, app. D (North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation 
Laboratory Report, Mar. 13, 1984). 
26  See Transcript, State v. Hunt, Nos. 85 CRS 16551-54, at 314–18 (Oct. 6–13, 1986) 
[hereinafter Hunt Tr.] (on file with author). 
27  See John Solomon, The End of a Failed Technique—but Not of a Prison Sentence, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 18, 2007 at A15 (stating that Hunt readily admits that he once was a major marijuana 
dealer). 
28  Pat Reese, Murders Remain Unsolved, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, June 8, 1986, at A2. 
29  Tom Krisher, Deputies Arrest Three in Double Homicide, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, Apr. 
17, 1985, at 1A. 
30  See Pat Reese, Drug Kingpin Faces Charges in Death Case, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, 
Apr. 16, 1985, at 1A (stating that area residents named the Hunt enclave, which was enclosed by a 
seven-foot-high wooden fence, as Fort Apache); Solomon, supra note 27 (describing Hunt’s home as 
fortified). 
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to Hunt being Native American.31  It was not explained further at trial, but the 
prosecution did, over defense objection, elicit the Fort Apache name for the area 
from Williford in his testimony in the Hunt trial.32 
More in dispute than his drug dealing but apparently clearly believed by the 
community and the authorities was that Hunt had a substantial role in violence in 
the community.  Although not presented to the jury at trial, Hunt introduced 
evidence at a hearing on his unsuccessful motion for change of venue that people 
in the community believed that he had links to several unsolved killings.33  A local 
newspaper article announcing his arrest called him a “Drug Kingpin” in its 
headline, discussed a part of Fayetteville that had “been gripped in a reign of terror 
during recent months,”34 described word of Hunt’s arrest rippling through that 
community to the relief of parents, and listed a group of deaths that were suggested 
to be related.35  The article strongly suggested the link between these community 
beliefs and the arrests, indicating that detectives had been “working for more than 
a year to nail Hunt and his associates.”36 
The belief of Hunt’s links to drug dealing and to violence was no doubt the 
reason for the early focus on Hunt and his associate Cashwell.  Within a month to 
six weeks after the murders, a sheriff’s deputy also contacted Williford, asking him 
if he had any knowledge regarding the murders.37  According to Williford’s 
testimony, the deputy told him that his car had been seen on River Road, the road 
                                                                                                                                                   
31  The term would be imprecise since Hunt is not an Apache but is instead a Lumbee Indian.  
The Lumbees are a Native American tribe found principally in the southeastern part of North 
Carolina, where Fayetteville is located.  In addition to Hunt, Kenneth West is a Lumbee.  See N.C. 
Dep’t of Corrections Records (on file with author) available at 
http://webapps6.doc.state.nc.us/apps/offender/offend1?DOCNUM=0197893&SENTENCEINFO=no
&SHOWPHOTO=no.  Cashwell, Williford, and the Matthews were white.  See Notes of March 2008 
conversation between Staples Hughes and author (on file with author). 
32  See Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 313.  The trial court overruled the objection for the 
inexplicable reason that it was received “solely for the purpose of identification of a given place and 
for no other purpose.”  Id. 
33  In an affidavit present in connection with a change of venue motion, Pat Reese, staff writer 
for the Fayetteville Observer stated that prior to Hunt’s arrest, “it was widely believed throughout the 
community where he lived that he was a volume dealer in narcotics and was responsible for several 
violent deaths.”  Affidavit of Pat Reese, Staff Writer, Fayetteville Observer at 1 (Sept. 20, 1985) (on 
file with author).  Reese indicated that he learned this information through conversations with people 
who lived and worked in that community.  Id. 
34  Reese, supra note 30, at 2A. 
35  See id. 
36  Id. at 1A.  Information is not available regarding the perception of investigative authorities 
on Hunt’s responsibility for violence, but their actions suggest that they shared the community view. 
37  See Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 373. 
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leading to the Matthews’ home.38  Williford testified that he was not arrested or 
given his Miranda warnings, and he testified he gave the deputy no information.39 
The important developments in the case occurred later in 1984 as Williford, 
who was on probation for robbery,40 picked up criminal charges, faced growing 
legal problems, and experienced incarceration.  First, in mid-November 1984, 
Williford was involved in an altercation in which he hit a man with his gun, which 
resulted in his arrest for aggravated assault and liability for possession of a weapon 
by a felon.41  In December, Williford’s lawyer set up a meeting between Williford 
and law enforcement personnel in the lawyer’s office.42  There is some indication 
in Williford’s testimony at Cashwell’s trial that he may have intimated some 
knowledge or involvement in the murder during that conversation, but it is clear 
that he did not directly implicate Hunt, Cashwell, or West.43 
Later in December 1984, Williford’s home was searched by his probation 
officer accompanied by law enforcement officers.  In the search, drug 
paraphernalia, cocaine, and marijuana were found.44  Unlike when he was arrested 
previously, Williford’s family did not post his bond, and he remained in jail 
between a week and two weeks before his girlfriend (he was separated from his 
wife) paid the bond.45  At the end of January 1985, Williford assaulted his wife,46 
and shortly thereafter he was arrested on a warrant for that offense and also for 
violation of the terms of his probation.  Bond was set at $25,000, which Williford 
was unable personally to post, and his family once again declined to post it for 
him.47 
On February 22, 1985, while still in jail, Williford made a lengthy statement 
to the police, which implicated Hunt, Cashwell, and a man he called Skip.48  A 
                                                                                                                                                   
38  See id. at 375.  He identified the deputy as Jimmy Cook.  Id.  However, no witness was 
produced at trial indicating that Cashwell’s car had been seen at that location. 
39  See id. at 373.  Williford testified that he could remember no contacts with law enforcement 
officers regarding the murder between the contact with Cook about a month after the murder and 
December 1984.  See id. at 437. 
40  See id. at 385; see also Transcript of Record at 48, State v. Cashwell, Nos. 85 CRS 16547-
50 (May 12–21, 1986) [hereinafter Cashwell Tr.] (on file with author).  The conviction for robbery 
occurred in 1981.  See id. 
41  See Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 383; see also Cashwell Tr., supra note 40, at 48.  
42  See Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 381.  Major Charles Smith, Detective Bruce Daws, and 
Billy Van Story from the District Attorney’s Office were present.  Id.  
43  At the Cashwell trial, Williford stated that he admitted his involvement in a “roundabout 
way,” but that he did not tell the truth.  “I didn’t implication [sic] what I should have.  I didn’t say 
much about it.”  Cashwell Tr., supra note 40, at. 47. 
44  See id. at 49–50.  Williford’s attorney was also present.  Id.  See also, Hunt Tr., supra note 
26, at 386. 
45  See Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 386–87. 
46  See id. at 388. 
47  See id. at 389. 
48  See id. at 391–93.  The statement was given to Sergeant Jack Watts and Major Charles 
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month later, with at least eight contacts by the police recorded in jail logs in the 
intervening period,49 Williford altered the statement to change Skip to Kenneth 
West.50  Williford later explained that after a conversation with his lawyer he 
realized that at some point—five months or five years from then—he might be 
charged with the murder for his involvement.  He testified that this realization, 
which may have been suggested by his lawyer, caused him to speak to the 
authorities.51 
In exchange for his testimony, the prosecution agreed to drop all pending 
charges from the murder and the string of arrests in late 1984 and early 1985, 
except the misdemeanor domestic violence charge, which he was to resolve for 
himself.  The dismissed charges included possession of a firearm by a felon, 
felonious possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and misdemeanor possession of 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia.  The State also agreed that Williford’s probation 
would not be revoked, and instead he would remain on probation.52 
Formal negotiations resulted in a written agreement between Williford and the 
prosecution,53 and he was released from jail in April 1985 when his family posted 
bond.54  Based on Williford’s statement and cooperation, Hunt, Cashwell, and 
West were arrested and indicted.  Williford was free the next year when he 
testified first against Cashwell and then against Hunt, and he remained free 
thereafter. 
The prosecution proceeded first to trial against Cashwell.  In a capital trial 
conducted in May 1986, Cashwell was convicted of two counts of first degree 
murder, but he was acquitted of two additional charges of conspiracy to commit 
murder.55  At the death penalty phase of the trial that followed his conviction, the 
                                                                                                                            
Smith.  See id. at 391.  
49  Williford was asked by defense counsel about being signed out of custody on the following 
dates in 1985 with investigative officers: February 28 with Detective Jack Watts and Major Charles 
Smith, Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 473, Cashwell Tr., supra note 40, at 1462; March 1 with Detective 
Bruce Daws, Cashwell Tr. at 1463; March 6 with Major Charles Smith, Hunt Tr. at 484, Cashwell Tr. 
at 1464; March 7 with Detective Jack Watts, Hunt Tr. at 484, Cashwell Tr. at 1466; March 8 with 
Detective Bruce Daws, Hunt Tr. at 485, Cashwell Tr. at 1466; March 14 with Detective Bruce Daws, 
Hunt Tr. at 486, Cashwell Tr. at 1467; March 16 with Detective Jack Watts, Hunt Tr. at 486–87, 
Cashwell Tr. at 1467; March 21 with Detective Jack Watts, Cashwell Tr. at 1468.  He was uncertain 
when and with whom he met.  The questions mentioned specific time periods and were apparently 
based on jail records. 
50  Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 394–95.  Williford testified that he named Kenneth West after 
West pointed a weapon at him while he was in a visiting area at the jail.  Id. at 410–12.  This 
statement was given to Detective Bruce Daws and Detective Robert L. Bittle.  Id. at 413.   
51  See Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 414; Cashwell Tr., supra note 40, at 76. 
52  See Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 395; Cashwell Tr., supra note 40, at 98–99 (giving terms of 
written agreement). 
53  See Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 430; Cashwell Tr., supra note 40, at 97.   
54  See Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 453.  He was released on bond on April 16, 1985.  Id. 
55  See Hunt MAR, supra note 4, at 4. 
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jury determined that he should be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than being 
executed.56   
Hunt was next tried, his trial taking place in October 1986.  As in Cashwell’s 
trial, Williford provided the principal evidence against Hunt.   
Williford testified that on the morning of March 6, 1984, in a meeting with 
Cashwell, West, and Williford, Hunt described a plan to get back at Roland 
Matthews for stealing ten to fourteen pounds of marijuana from him.  Cashwell 
was to meet Matthews as he left his place of work and go home with him.  
Williford, following the plan, returned to Hunt’s home in the early morning hours 
of March 7 and drove Hunt and West to the Matthews house. 
Williford testified that he waited in his car nearby and subsequently picked 
the men up.  West was carrying a trash bag, which Williford later saw contained 
marijuana.  Williford testified that he did not know in advance that the Matthews 
would be murdered nor did he immediately learn of the murders when the men 
returned to the car.  However, he said that he saw what appeared to be blood on the 
men.57  Later he learned in the newspaper about the murders.58  Williford testified 
that he learned more about the events when, in Hunt’s presence, West spoke of the 
ease with which the marijuana had been recovered, and, referring to Lisa 
Matthews’ murder,59 he said: “Yeah, that fat bitch begged us not to kill her too.”60 
Another person who offered incriminating information against Hunt was 
Jeffrey Dale Goodman, a classic jailhouse informant who had served as an 
informant previously.61  His testimony was that, while he and Hunt were 
incarcerated together, Hunt made incriminating statements regarding the crime.62  
Goodman testified that Hunt stated that the police lacked direct evidence against 
him of the murders and recounted their sequence and some details regarding the 
victims’ reactions.  These statements were inferentially quite incriminating.  They 
showed substantial inside knowledge of the crime and suggested guilt.  Other 
                                                                                                                                                   
56  See Hunt MAR, supra note 4, app. E (Sentencing Recommendations), at 6. 
Cashwell’s convictions were reversed on appeal.  See State v. Cashwell, 369 S.E.2d 569, 576–
80 (N.C. 1988) (reversing conviction because jailhouse informant Samuel Thompson was permitted 
erroneously to recount that Cashwell said he was in jail for attempting to kill his girlfriend).  On 
remand, he entered pleas of guilty to two counts of second degree murder and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment plus fifty years.  See Hunt MAR, supra note 4, at 4. 
57  See Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 320–48 (relating the crime narrative).  Williford indicated 
that West and Hunt were each armed with a gun and a knife when he saw them on the morning of 
March 6 but he did not notice whether they were armed when he drove them to the Matthews house 
that night.  Id. at 338–39. 
58  See id. at 349. 
59  See id. at 368–69. 
60  Id. at 368. 
61  See id. at 954–56 (Sgt. H.M. Flowers of the sheriff’s office in Hillsborough County, Florida 
describing aid Goodman gave for benefit regarding one case in 1976 and further aid in three other 
cases extending to 1983, the information in the later cases allegedly provided without any reward). 
62  See id. at 551–61.  
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statements indicated that Hunt was concerned about the possibility of one person 
“turning State’s evidence against him.”63  However, assuming Goodman’s account 
of Hunt’s statements are accurate, Goodman did not claim that Hunt ever said he 
was present or directly involved in the murders.64  Goodman indicated that he 
understood the killing was “over drug money.”65  
Goodman relayed his information to a State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) 
investigator, whom he had contacted about another matter.  The SBI investigator 
subsequently brought a detective involved in the Matthews investigation to talk to 
Goodman, and on December 9, 1985, Detective Robert Bittle of the Cumberland 
County Sheriff Department took a written statement from Goodman.66 
At trial, Goodman testified that he was arrested in February 1985 and was 
serving a ten-year sentence for breaking and entering, on which he would be 
eligible for parole consideration in August 1987.  In exchange for his testimony, 
the State agreed he would not be placed back into the North Carolina prison system 
but would be housed in a local jail facility and that his name would be submitted 
for possible commutation of his sentence and parole.67  On December 16, 1986, 
two months after his testimony against Hunt, the deal paid off.  Goodman’s 
sentence was commuted, and he was released.68  
After the defense put on evidence from Hunt and witnesses associated with 
him that Cashwell said he alone did the murders,69 the State called Samuel 
Thompson in rebuttal.  Thompson’s testimony was received “for the limited 
purpose of impeaching Mr. Cashwell’s hearsay statements [offered by defense 
                                                                                                                                                   
63  Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 564. 
64  See id. at 560–64. 
65  Id. at 561. 
66  See id. at 564–65, 602.  The written statement is included in the record.  See id. at 599–602.  
67  See id. at 566, 568.  A written statement setting out these terms was signed on October 8, 
1986.  See id. at 567–68. 
68  See N.C. Dep’t of Corr., Jeffery Dale Goodman, Offender ID 0149722 (showing 
“Conditional Commutation”) (on file with author) available at 
http://webapps6.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?method=view&offenderID=0149722&searchOf
fenderID=0149722&listurl=pagelist offendersearchresults&listpage=1. 
69  Hunt testified that Cashwell told Hunt that he (Cashwell) committed the murders, 
indicating in his testimony that Cashwell had first suggested that he was involved in a conversation 
with Kenneth Womble, who then mentioned the conversation to Hunt.  Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 
137.  Kenneth Womble testified that Cashwell asked Womble to give him an alibi (that they had been 
together at a bar) and Womble told Hunt that Cashwell had told him that he, Cashwell, did 
“something he shouldn’t have done.”  Id. at 91–92.  Danny Morrison testified that Cashwell told him 
and Hunt that he, Cashwell, had killed the Matthews after an argument.  Id. at 109–10.  Glenn 
Maynor testified that Cashwell told him that he killed the Matthews and wanted Maynor to take him 
to River Road to retrieve his knife and gun.  Id. at 118.  Victor Rhone testified that Cashwell had 
asked him to take him to River Road to get his gun and knife, but that Cashwell decided to have 
Maynor take him.  Id. at 103.  Hunt was clearly self-interested and the other witnesses were friends 
and associates of Hunt.  As a result, their claims are all subject to a heavy discount. 
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witnesses but was] not received for any substantive purpose.”70  Thompson was 
another classic jailhouse informant.  He testified to statements by Cashwell that 
incriminated Cashwell and Hunt.  Thompson testified that Cashwell described how 
he shot and stabbed Roland Matthews, Hunt shot Lisa Matthews twice in the head, 
and West cut her up.71  Thompson said the reason Cashwell gave for the murders 
was because “Roland Matthews was a backstabbing son of a bitch”72 and because 
Hunt, Cashwell, and West were concerned that Roland was going to give 
information to the authorities about their drug-selling operation.73 
Thompson was in jail charged with two counts of armed robbery.74  He came 
to the attention of the authorities in Hunt’s case when he wrote a letter to the 
Attorney General’s office offering information against Hunt.75  After receiving 
news of the letter, Sergeant Jack Watts and Detective Robert Bittle, who also took 
the statement from Goodman, visited Thompson in August 1985 in the local jail 
and took his oral statement, which was reduced to writing and signed in March 
1986. 
Under an agreement formally reached in May 1986,76 Thompson’s two armed 
robbery charges were reduced to common law robbery, with the State 
recommending that the sentences be consolidated into a single three-year term to 
be served in a local jail facility.77  Shortly after the Cashwell trial, Thompson 
entered his guilty pleas and received the agreed-upon sentence.78  He was paroled 
in August 1986, within three months, meaning that he was free on unsupervised 
parole when he testified against Hunt.79 
                                                                                                                                                   
70  Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 868.  
71  Id. at 875. 
72  Id. at 874. 
73  See id. 
74  Id. at 869 (acknowledging the two armed robbery charges).  These charges arose out of two 
separate incidents, a little more than a week apart, in which Thompson allegedly robbed convenience 
store operators at gun point.  See id. at 891 (discussing robbery of Quick Stop in Spring Lake, North 
Carolina using a gun on May 7, 1985); id. at 893 (discussing robbery of another Quick Stop in Hope 
Mills, North Carolina using a gun on May 16, 1985). 
75    Id. at 880–81.  
76  See id. 
77  See id. at 885–86.  
78  See id. at 887.  The guilty plea was entered on May 29, 1986.  See N.C. Dep’t of 
Corrections Records (on file with author). 
79  See Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 907, 913. 
Thompson was arrested for these offenses on May 27, 1985.  Id. at 893.  He, thus, had been in 
jail almost exactly a year when he entered his guilty plea on May 29, 1986.  See supra note 78.  
When he was released on unsupervised parole a few months later in August 1986, he had spent 
roughly the same amount of time in jail—fourteen to fifteen months—toward the same three-year 
sentence under the same laws and confined in the same local institutions as West had when he 
entered his guilty plea on February 26, 1987. 
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The final informant, who provided no direct or indirect evidence against Hunt 
at his trial but whose “testimony” should be considered on the issue of whether 
Hunt is innocent, is the alleged co-participant, Kenneth West.  On February 26, 
1987, West entered guilty pleas to two counts of accessory after the fact to murder 
and no contest pleas to two counts of conspiracy to commit murder.  In exchange, 
the State agreed that two of the convictions would be consolidated into a single 
presumptive sentence of three years and that the other two would be consolidated 
into a ten-year sentence, with the State recommending that the ten-year sentence be 
suspended for a period of five years of probation.80  Under the agreement, West 
was required to affirm under oath a statement of the facts in the Matthews’ case,81 
and, among other terms, he agreed to testify truthfully at any time within the next 
five years against Cashwell and Hunt on any new trial motion or motion for 
appropriate relief they might file.82  After this plea, West had less than two weeks 
until release.83 
The facts in the proffer read by the prosecutor differed in several important 
aspects from Williford’s testimony.  For example, the date of the conversations 
setting up the trip to the Matthews’ home and the time of the fateful trip were 
different,84 and the role West played changed.  Williford’s testimony put West 
inside the Matthew’s house during the murders where he could hear Lisa Matthews 
beg for her life.  In contrast, in West’s sworn proffer, he assumed the role of 
lookout, remaining outside the Matthews’ house while Hunt and Cashwell went 
inside where the murders occurred.  This meant he could not have heard Lisa 
Matthews plead that her life be spared.85  Also, the proffer stated that the reason for 
the fateful visit was that “Roland Matthews, and Lisa Matthews owed him money.  
Lee Wayne told us that he was going to go up there the next night; and that if they 
did not have his money, that he was going to take care of them.”86  
                                                                                                                                                   
80  See West Tr., supra note 12, at 5–6. 
81  Id. at 8, 13–14. 
82  See id. at 7. 
83  West had every reason to believe liberty was at the doorstep, and although the records 
showing that fact are not available today, he was legally entitled to release in less than two weeks, if 
not immediately.  See supra note 12. 
84  Williford testified that the conversation setting up the trip took place on the morning of 
March 6, 1984 before he went to work and that he returned to pick up Hunt and West sometime after 
midnight on what was then March 7, varying that time to much earlier in the morning of either 3:00 
a.m. or 4:00 a.m. in his statements on February 22, 1985 and March 22, 1985.  See Hunt Tr., supra 
note 26, at 321–39, 471.  By contrast, West’s sworn proffer was that the meeting setting up the trip to 
the Matthews’ home occurred on Monday, which was March 5 and, therefore, a day earlier than 
Williford testified.  See West Tr., supra note 12, at 9.  Also, in his proffer, West arrived at Hunt’s 
house at 8:00 p.m. on the night of the trip and a little while later Williford arrived, not the seven to 
eight hour delay of Williford’s time line.  See id. at 9–10. 
85  See West Tr., supra note 12, at 9–13. 
86  Id. at 9.  West never indicated that he saw or knew that marijuana was in the trash bag 
carried from the Matthews’ home.  See id. at 11. 
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B. The Extraordinary: Defendant Cashwell’s Statements of Hunt’s Innocence  
 
In 1985, Staples Hughes, who is currently head of the North Carolina 
Appellate Defender Office, was working as an assistant public defender in 
Fayetteville.  He was representing Jerry Dale Cashwell on the charge of assaulting 
his girlfriend when new charges were brought against Cashwell for the Matthews 
murders.  Hughes began representing Cashwell on the new charges, teamed with 
the head of the public defender office.87 
Hughes was soon confronted with a very difficult quandary for a defense 
attorney.  During a conference early in the representation, Cashwell stated that he 
alone had killed Roland and Lisa Matthews in a fit of rage, a set of facts 
completely at odds with the prosecution’s theory and the evidence it subsequently 
presented at trial.  By contrast to Cashwell’s account, Williford’s version gave 
Cashwell an argument to avoid the death penalty.  Williford cast Hunt as the 
originator and mastermind of the plot to kill the Matthews couple, and indeed, the 
jury in the death penalty phase of Cashwell’s trial found Hunt’s role as mastermind 
was a mitigating circumstance for Cashwell.88 
Hunt subpoenaed Cashwell as a witness at his trial, but Cashwell refused to 
testify on Fifth Amendment grounds.89  Hughes acknowledges that he advised 
Cashwell not to testify because his conviction was then on appeal and a retrial was 
quite possible.90  Despite providing sound legal advice to Cashwell to protect his 
interests, Hughes was nevertheless much relieved when Hunt’s jury decided that he 
should be sentenced to prison and spared him from the possibility of execution.91  
After his conviction was overturned on appeal, Cashwell pled guilty to two 
counts of second degree murder and was sentenced to life plus fifty years.92  In 
Hughes’ opinion, placing sole responsibility for the murders on Cashwell would 
have eliminated all hope of his release on parole, even as an elderly man.  
Accordingly, Hughes never considered disclosing Cashwell’s confession to him 
while Cashwell was alive.93 
                                                                                                                                                   
87  See Transcript of Trial at 7, 30, State v. Hunt, Nos. 85-CRS 16551-54 (Jan. 8, 2007) 
[hereinafter Transcript of Hearing on Hunt MAR] (on file with author). 
88  See Hunt MAR, supra note 4, app. E (Sentencing Recommendations) at 4. 
89  See Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 657–60 (showing Hughes’ advice that Cashwell should 
assert the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, Cashwell’s assertion of the 
privilege, and the trial court’s acceptance of it, all transpiring in front of the jury).   
90  Affidavit of Staples S. Hughes at 4 (Dec. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Hughes Affidavit] (on file 
with author); Hunt MAR, supra note 4, at 12 app. B.  In fact, the conviction was reversed by the 
North Carolina Supreme Court.  See Cashwell, 369 S.E.2d  at 569. 
91  See Conversation with Staples S. Hughes (Mar. 2008) (on file with author); E-mail from 
Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, to Robert Mosteller, Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke 
University School of Law  (May 21, 2008) (on file with author). 
92  Hunt MAR, supra note 4, at 4. 
93  See Hughes Response Letter, supra note 5, at 3. 
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Despite understanding as a lawyer the legal soundness of his position, Hughes 
was deeply troubled by keeping Cashwell’s revelation confidential through the 
years,94 as Hunt, a man Hughes firmly believed to be innocent, remained in 
prison.95  Then, starting in 2002, a series of events began that ultimately led 
Hughes to reveal his secret to an attorney representing Hunt and to attempt to 
present his testimony about that statement in a post-conviction proceeding seeking 
Hunt’s release.  The first of these events was Cashwell’s suicide while in prison in 
August 2002.  Next, in March 2003, the North Carolina State Bar amended Rule 
1.6(b)(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct to state that a lawyer may reveal 
confidential client information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes it 
necessary “to prevent reasonably certain death or bodily harm.”96  Finally, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court in 2003 and 2004 decided two cases (Miller I & II) 
regarding the attorney-client privilege in criminal cases where the client was 
deceased.  Although dealing with a different set of facts, these cases ruled that the 
privileged information could in some criminal cases be revealed after the client’s 
death.97 
                                                                                                                                                   
94  See id. (describing his frequent thoughts about the case and recounting a recurring dream of 
being imprisoned that always evoked thoughts of Hunt’s imprisonment). 
95  See id. at 4–6. 
96  See N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT  R. 1.6(b)(3). 
97  The Court decided two cases: In re Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. 2003) (Miller I), and In re 
Miller, 595 S.E.2d 120 (N.C. 2004) (Miller II).  The litigation that led to the decisions in Miller I and 
Miller II involved disclosures by a lawyer of his client’s privileged statement regarding the criminal 
liability of an additional party in the crime rather than incrimination of the client.  The North Carolina 
Supreme Court ruled, however, that the privilege was not absolute after the death of the client as it 
was before death. 
In Miller I, it stated: 
When a client retains an attorney for legal advice in regard to an ongoing criminal 
investigation, the client’s desire to keep the communication confidential is premised upon 
three possible consequences in the event of disclosure: (1) that disclosure might subject 
the client to criminal liability; (2) that disclosure might subject the client, or the client’s 
estate, to civil liability; and (3) that disclosure might harm the client’s loved ones or his 
reputation.  See Swidler [& Berlin v. United States], 524 U.S. [399], 407 [(1998)] . . . .  
Therefore, in determining whether the reasons for the privilege still exist after the client 
is deceased, the trial court should consider the Swidler factors.  In the instant case, the 
trial court should consider whether these possible consequences would apply to, or would 
have any negative or harmful effect on, [the client’s] rights and interests if the State was 
permitted to obtain the information communicated between [the client] and respondent.  
In the event the trial court, upon in camera review, should conclude that any of these 
consequences still apply to any portion of the communications, they should remain 
undisclosed.  If, on the other hand, the trial court should determine that the 
communications asserted to be privileged would have no negative impact on [the client’s] 
interests, the purpose for the privilege no longer exists.  When application of the privilege 
will no longer safeguard the client's interests, no reason exists in support of perpetual 
nondisclosure. 
Miller I, 584 S.E.2d at 790. 
By contrast with the Miller I possibility of an exception to the attorney-client privilege in the 
specific context of evidence incriminating a third party sought by the prosecution, the rule in federal 
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These events caused Hughes to reveal the confidential information from 
Cashwell that he alone killed the Matthews couple.98  Hughes disclosed the 
information to Hunt’s attorney and provided an affidavit, which recounted that in 
the initial conversation with Cashwell, he denied any participation.  The most 
significant parts of Hughes’ affidavit, which recounts the key facts as he saw them, 
are set out below: 
 
 4.  Our next interview with Cashwell occurred a few days later, at the 
jail.  Ms. [Mary Ann] Tally99 told Cashwell that Hunt was saying 
that he had nothing to do with the killings—that Cashwell did them 
alone.  She asked Cashwell why Hunt would say that.  Cashwell at 
first said nothing—he just hung his head.  And then he said “I guess 
because I did it.” 
 
 5.  Cashwell then told us, in great detail, what had happened at the 
Matthews’ house.  My memory is that Cashwell told us that he and 
the Matthews’ were watching the television, and there was some 
                                                                                                                            
court under Swidler is that the attorney-client privilege remains in full force despite the death of the 
client.  Swidler, 524 U.S. at 410–11 (concluding that the general common law rule has been for a 
century that the privilege continues after the client’s death  and that the Independent Counsel do not 
make a sufficiently compelling case to overcome that body of law).  In dissent, Justice O’Connor 
argued that exceptions should be recognized upon the death of the client in criminal prosecutions 
where the interest in obtain evidence unavailable by other means outweighs the potential disincentive 
that disclosure would cause to forthright client communication.  She specifically noted that in 
addition to “a compelling law enforcement interest,” id. at 416, such an exception should be granted 
“[w]here the exoneration of an innocent criminal defendant . . . is at stake.”  Id. (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).  The majority noted that the Petitioner, who supported maintenance of the privilege, 
conceded that disclosure might be required to avoid violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights 
for exculpatory information, but in the present circumstances, it did not need to reach that issue.  
Swidler, 524 U.S. at 408 n.3.  The majority presumably was referring to the recognition by Petitioner 
in its brief of the need recognized by a number of courts to disclose privileged information if such 
information was exculpatory evidence needed to free the innocent.  Brief for Petitioners at 29, 
Swidler, 524 U.S. 399, Petitioners v. United States, No. 97-1192 (Apr. 29, 1998). 
98  In his letter to the North Carolina State Bar in support of Hughes, Professor Ken Broun 
argued a connection between the rationale of Miller II and the appropriate interpretation of the ethics 
rule: 
The Miller case deals with the attorney-client privilege rather than the confidentiality 
provisions of Rule 1.6.  Nevertheless, the Court’s holding in Miller . . . says a great deal 
about how this state and its courts view the confidential relationship between lawyer and 
client.  The Court held that the attorney-client privilege survived the death of the client.  
However, it also clearly stated that the privilege would not be enforced if “the disclosure 
does not expose the client’s estate to civil liability or likely result in additional harm to 
loved ones or reputation.”  In re Miller, . . . 595 S.E.2d at 122. 
Letter from Kenneth S. Broun to the North Carolina State Bar Grievance Committee 2 (Apr. 2, 2007) 
(on file with author). 
99  Mary Ann Tally was the head of the public defender office where Hughes worked, and 
Hughes tried the case as co-counsel with her.  See Hughes Affidavit, supra note 90, at 1; Cashwell 
Tr., supra note 40, at 7, 30.   
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argument about turning the volume up—Cashwell had serious 
hearing problems.  Cashwell told us he just “lost it.”  He went up 
behind one of the victims and shot that person from the rear.  He 
then shot the other, who had jumped up.  He then cut them with a 
knife.  Cashwell never could give us a good reason for the 
killings—he just “lost it” and they happened.  Cashwell also gave us 
a very detailed account of what he did right after the murders.  I 
remember that Cashwell told us that he walked to his mother’s 
house in East Fayetteville, and that he asked his mother to put his 
blue-jean jacket into the dryer because it was wet from the rain. 
 
 6.  We specifically asked Cashwell if Lee Wayne Hunt was involved in 
any way, and he told us that Hunt had nothing to do with the 
murders. 
 
 7. Ms. Tally, Cashwell and I discussed the crime at various times 
during the course of our representation of Cashwell.  He never 
varied in any material way from the version he gave us that day: he 
killed the Matthews’, and he did it alone. 
 
 8.  I had no doubt then, and I have no doubt now, that Cashwell was 
telling us the truth when he said that he acted alone.  Cashwell was 
not boasting when he told us what happened—it obviously pained 
him to recount the killings to us, at least the first time.  What 
Cashwell told us was consistent with everything I knew about how 
the killings happened.  It was also consistent with what I knew 
about Cashwell.  He was volatile and dangerous, and was apt to lose 
control and assault people in a rage.  It was this sort of uncontrolled 
rage that underlay, as I remember it, the assault against [his 
girlfriend on which Hughes first represented Cashwell].  This rage 
was also consistent with another incident which we discovered, in 
which Cashwell had lost control and had badly damaged a girl’s car 
with an ax or a hatchet. 
 
 9.  Cashwell’s version only hurt him—it was totally against his interest.  
It made things very difficult for us as his defense lawyers, and 
Cashwell knew that.  Among other things, it made it almost 
impossible for us to negotiate a plea bargain.  I remember going to 
the Raleigh office of one of the prosecutors in the case, William 
Farrell, to get some discovery.  I asked Mr. Farrell if there was a 
chance for a plea, and he told me that the prosecutors would be very 
interested in what Cashwell had to say.  Given what Cashwell had 
told us, the plea option quickly died. 
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 10. At Cashwell’s trial, we knew Williford, who testified to both 
Cashwell and Hunt’s involvement in the Murder, was lying.  
However, we could not attempt to prove that by putting Cashwell on 
the stand.  Fortunately for Cashwell, Williford’s concocted story 
made Hunt the chief villain, so we were able to argue at sentencing 
that, according to the state’s evidence, Hunt was the mastermind.  
But, given what Cashwell had told us, we could not, and did not, put 
up any independent evidence to support that theory. 
 
 11. Hunt’s lawyers subpoenaed Cashwell as a defense witness at Hunt’s 
trial.  Cashwell refused to testify, resting upon his Fifth Amendment 
right not to incriminate himself.  Cashwell did not want to help 
Hunt.  Cashwell believed that Hunt was responsible for Cashwell 
getting arrested on these charges.  Knowing that a retrial of 
Cashwell’s case was possible, Ms. Tally and I also advised 
Cashwell not to testify. . . .  
 
 13. As I understood the Disciplinary Rules of the North Carolina State 
Bar, I was absolutely bound to keep my client’s confidences absent 
his consent to reveal them.  I also knew that it was totally against 
Cashwell’s interests for his admissions to get out.  I therefore 
revealed what Cashwell had told us only to my wife and to some of 
the fellow attorneys in the Public Defender’s office . . . [and 
perhaps] Cashwell’s appellate lawyer . . . . 
 
 15. I remained deeply troubled about my silence over the years.  I knew 
that my silence had helped put an innocent man in prison for life.  I 
know that Cashwell eventually also became troubled by what he had 
done, or had failed to do, although to my knowledge he never did 
anything to rectify the situation . . . .100 
 
The response of the State of North Carolina to Hughes’ affidavit was curious.  
At least in its public presentation, it was not to inquire seriously as to whether this 
potentially important revelation by a respected public official was perhaps true.  It 
was also not the careful independent inquiry that the Attorney General’s Office has 
rightfully received praise for in the Duke Lacrosse Case.101 
                                                                                                                                                   
100 Hughes Affidavit, supra note 90, at 2–5. 
101 One clear difference between these two cases is that the Attorney General’s Office stood 
independent of District Attorney Nifong’s conduct in the initial investigation and prosecution of the 
Duke Lacrosse Case.  By contrast, lawyers from the Attorney General’s Office served as special 
prosecutors in the Cashwell and Hunt cases.  The Cumberland County District Attorney’s Office 
asked for this assistance because Gene Williford’s cousin was a prosecutor in that office.  See 
Cashwell Tr., supra note 40, at 1442 (describing Mike Williford, a member of the district Attorney’s 
office as Gene Williford’s cousin), Conversation with Rich Rosen (Apr. 2008) (on file with author); 
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Instead, the State first moved to strike the affidavit because the revelation 
violated the deceased defendant’s attorney-client privilege and also to request that 
the trial court report Hughes to the North Carolina State Bar for violating the North 
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct.102  At the hearing on the Motion for 
Appropriate Relief, the trial judge interrupted Hughes’ testimony to admonish him 
that the information he was about to disclose was confidential under North 
Carolina ethics rules and that, if he provided the testimony, the trial judge felt duty 
bound to report him to the North Carolina State Bar.103 
Although the trial court subsequently ruled that Hughes’ testimony was 
inadmissible because of the attorney-client privilege,104 the court permitted the 
defense to question Hughes and record his sworn testimony.105  In that testimony, 
Hughes reiterated and expanded on the facts in his affidavit and on the impact that 
his silence and Hunt’s continued incarceration had on him.106  
In an order denying relief, the trial court ruled that the evidence offered by 
Hughes violated the attorney-client privilege, potentially violated the North 
Carolina ethics rules, and was inadmissible hearsay.107  Defendant Hunt sought 
review in the North Carolina Court of Appeals, but relief was denied without 
hearing.108  Hunt then filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief, citing Rule 2 of the 
North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, which allows the state supreme court 
                                                                                                                            
E-mail from Staples S. Hughes to author (May 2008) (on file with author).  Thus, in its reaction to the 
possibility of earlier error by the prosecution, the Attorney General’s Office in the Hunt case did not 
stand separate and independent. 
102 See State’s Answer to Defendant’s Motion for Appropriate Relief at 12–13, State v. Hunt, 
Nos. 85 CRS 16551-54 (Oct. 13, 2005) (on file with author).  
103 See Transcript of Hearing on Hunt MAR, supra note 87, at 11–12.  
Later in the proceeding, the defense asked for a ruling that the privilege no longer existed after 
the death of the client under the facts of the case and the rulings of the North Carolina Supreme Court 
in the Miller cases, but the trial court denied the request, ruling that in his opinion the privilege 
remained intact.  See Id.  at 43–47. 
104 See id. at 47. 
105 See id. at 17. 
106 See id. at 17–43. 
107 See Order, at 7–16, paras. 3–32 (Apr. 23, 2007), Hunt, Nos. 85-CRS 16551-54 (denying 
Motion for Appropriate Relief) (on file with author).  
In his order, the trial judge stated that, even if he considered the affidavit and testimony of 
Hughes, he would not grant relief under the standards for newly discovered evidence.  Id. at 16–17, 
para. 35.  However, in this hypothetical evaluation, the judge could not take into account the 
testimony of attorneys Mary Ann Tally and Stephen Freedman, who were called to testify further 
about Cashwell’s communications but refused to testify because of the court’s ruling that to do so 
would violate Cashwell’s attorney-client privilege, or the affidavits of their intended testimony, 
which were provided to the court but sealed and therefore unavailable.  See Transcript of Hearing on 
Hunt MAR, supra note 87, at 47–59.  Moreover, in this discussion of the inadequacy of the showing 
of the “newly discovered” evidence, the trial judge continued not to consider Hughes’ evidence fully 
but instead relied on the determination that it was inadmissible hearsay.  See id. at 18–19, para. 39. 
108 See Order, State v. Hunt, COAP07-567, (Aug. 14, 2007) (denying petition without 
comment on the merits) (on file with author). 
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to decide a question of exceptional importance and to correct a manifest 
injustice.109  The petition included the signature of former Chief Justice I. Beverly 
Lake, Jr.,110 who both wrote the majority opinion in Miller I111 and spearheaded the 
creation of the North Carolina Commission on Actual Innocence.112  Nevertheless, 
the North Carolina Supreme Court denied the request for review without hearing 
and without substantive comment.113 
The next arenas of hope for Hunt are the North Carolina Commission on 
Actual Innocence114 and the federal courts, primarily under a claim of actual 
innocence.115 
Attorney Staples Hughes fared far better in resolving his legal conflict than 
Hunt did with his effort to secure a new trial.  In February 2007, Hughes received a 
“Substance of Grievance” letter from the North Carolina State Bar asking him to 
respond to allegations that he violated North Carolina’s ethics rules.116  In his 
reply, Hughes gave a further and more substantial statement of the ethical dilemma 
and the human conflict that this revelation caused: “Tragically, my decision to 
delay my disclosure until after Jerry’s death may have helped condemn an innocent 
man to prison for the rest of his life.  So much of the information that might have 
helped free Mr. Hunt is now out of reach.”117 
In support of his position that he acted ethically, Hughes subsequently 
submitted to the Bar three affidavits from authorities on professional ethics: 
Professor Bruce A. Green, Stein Professor of Law at Fordham Law School; 
Professor Nancy J. Moore, Nancy Barton Scholar at Boston University School of 
Law; and John Wesley Hall, Jr., President-Elect of the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers.118  In his affidavit, Professor Green concluded that 
                                                                                                                                                   
109 See Petition Requesting Review under Rule 2, at 1 (Nov. 27, 2007), Hunt, 85 CRS 16651-
54 (on file with author). 
110 See id. at 30. 
111 See Miller I, 584 S.E.2d at 776.  
112 See Titan Barksdale, A Powerful Voice Joins Hunt Defense, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), 
Dec. 1, 2007  at B1. 
113 See State v. Hunt, 659 S.E.2d 6, 6 (2008) (considering the petition for review under Rule 2 
as a petition for certiorari and denying it). 
114 The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission was created by the General Assembly 
in 2006.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1460–15A-1470 (2007).  The Commission is charged with 
providing an independent and balanced truth-seeking forum for credible claims of innocence in North 
Carolina.  The Commission reviews, investigates, and hears post-conviction innocence claims if new 
evidence of innocence has come to light. 
115 See Steve Ford, Years in Prison—But Is He a Killer?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Feb. 
10, 2008, at E6 (noting the denial of review by the North Carolina Supreme Court and stating that 
unless Hunt is successful in his claim in federal court he is likely to remain in prison). 
116 See Substance of Grievance at 1, N.C. State Bar v. Hughes, No. 07G0139 (Feb. 6, 2007) 
(on file with author). 
117 Hughes Response Letter, supra note 5, at 8. 
118 Professors Kenneth S. Broun and Richard Rosen of the University of North Carolina Law 
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Hughes had discretion under the rules of ethics to reveal the confidences of his 
deceased client.119  He relied upon ethical decisions in other jurisdictions,120 and 
although he drew no firm conclusion regarding the meaning of Rule 1.6(b)(3), he 
saw its adoption by North Carolina as reflecting “the societal importance of 
protecting third parties from significant physical harm.”121  He suggested that 
many would regard life imprisonment of an innocent individual as the equivalent 
of “bodily harm,” but even if this provision were read not to include an innocent 
individual’s incarceration within the meaning of “bodily harm,” he believed it 
“anomalous to deprive a lawyer of discretion to prevent a harm, namely, lifetime 
deprivation of liberty that is comparable to bodily harm, when the former client is 
deceased and will not be prejudiced by the disclosure.”122  Green also relied on the 
North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in Miller I, which made it “reasonable 
for Hughes to conclude that he had discretion to disclose Cashwell’s confidences 
posthumously to free an innocent man.”123  
Professor Moore reached the same conclusion.124  Indeed, she concluded that 
Hughes “properly and admirably exercised his right under the current North 
Carolina Rules to voluntarily reveal Cashwell’s confession in order to prevent the 
continuing incarceration of an innocent man condemned to life imprisonment.”125  
In reaching this conclusion, she relied principally on North Carolina Rule 
1.6(b)(3), concluding that a sentence of life imprisonment constituted “serious 
bodily harm” under that provision and permits a lawyer to disclose a confidential 
communication.126 
                                                                                                                            
School, who also represent Hunt, wrote letters defending Hughes’ conduct.  See Letter from Kenneth 
S. Broun to Grievance Comm., N.C. State Bar (Apr. 2, 2007) (on file with author); Letter from 
Richard Rosen to Grievance Comm., N.C. State Bar (April 2, 2007) (on file with author).  In his 
letter, Rosen argued, inter alia, that it would be ironic if the Bar punished a lawyer “whose only 
concern was that justice be done.”  Id. at 2. 
119 See Affidavit of Bruce A. Green at 3–9, In re Staples Hughes, Bar File No. 07G0139 (Mar. 
26, 2007) (on file with author). 
120 Id. at 3–5 (citing State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976) & Morales v. Portuondo, 
165 F. Supp. 2d 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). 
121 Id. at 6. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 8. 
124 See Affidavit of Nancy J. Moore at 4–5, In re Hughes, Bar File No. 07G0139 (Mar. 26, 
2007) (on file with author).  See also Colin Miller, Ordeal By Innocence: Why There Should Be a 
Wrongful Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 391, 395–403 (arguing that the exception to the requirement of confidential in 
disciplinary rule 1.6 for “substantial bodily injury” can and should be interpreted to be satisfied by 
wrongful incarceration).  Cf. Peter Joy & Kevin McMunigal, Confidentiality and Wrongful 
Incarceration, 23 CRIM. JUST. 46, 46–49 (Summer 2008) (describing proposed amendment to Model 
Rule 1.6 that would permit disclosure by defense attorneys of confidential information from a client 
exculpating another). 
125 Affidavit of Moore, supra note 124, at 5. 
126 Id. at 3–4. 
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In his affidavit, Hall indicated that he was a “practitioner’s expert” rather than 
an “academic expert,” providing affidavits and testimony in numerous cases on 
attorney-client privilege, confidentiality, and related issues.127  Relying principally 
on Rule 1.6(b)(3), Hall opined that before Cashwell’s death Hughes appropriately 
kept the confidence, but after his client’s death he had discretion to make the 
disclosure.128  He concluded that Hughes exercised reasonable discretion in 
disclosing the confidence as required by the rules,129 and he acted “thoughtfully, 
ethically, morally, and lawfully.”130 
On January 25, 2008, Hughes was sent a letter by James R. Fox, Chair of the 
North Carolina Bar Grievance Committee.  The letter stated: “The Committee 
determined that there was not probable cause to believe that you violated the Rules 
of Professional Conduct and dismissed the grievance.”131 
The ethical issues that Hughes faced are extraordinarily significant.  However, 
the focus of this article is the impact of informants on Hunt’s case and others in his 
situation and reforms designed to limit the damage informants may inflict on the 
innocent.  It is to those subjects that I now turn. 
 
C. The Expected, the Curious, and the Missing 
 
In the Hunt case, the extraordinary development is the evidence that Jerry 
Cashwell admitted to sole responsibility for the murder.  This occurred early in the 
case, to his attorneys, and with a version of the event that is virtually impossible to 
square with Hunt’s guilt.  The case involved other features, which are not so 
extraordinary, but which are quite notable. 
 
1. The Expected 
 
A completely unexpected aspect of Cashwell’s statement to Hughes was that 
he killed Roland and Lisa because he became enraged—“lost it”—over the 
incredibly trivial matter of the TV volume exacerbated by his sensitivity over a 
progressive hearing loss.  The four other versions of the motive for the killing were 
each different and were entirely predictable if one were picking from a list possible 
motivations.  I accept that the expected is often the truth, but at least the expected 
versions should be consistent. 
                                                                                                                                                   
127 See Affidavit of John Wesley Hall, Jr., at 3–4, In re Grievance against Hughes, Grievance 
No. 07G0139 (Dec. 4, 2007) (on file with author). 
128 See id. at 6, 8. 
129 See id. at 9. 
130 Id. at 10. 
131 Letter from James R. Fox, Chair, Grievance Comm. of the N.C. State Bar, to Staples S. 
Hughes, Attorney at Law (Jan. 25, 2008) (on file with author). 
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Williford claimed that the motive was the theft of ten to fourteen pounds of 
marijuana by the Matthews.132  This version is not corroborated by external sources 
or the other witnesses who testified in favor of the government.  It apparently is 
either the standard assumption about presumed drug murders in the locality or is 
the common practice.  In the same article that recounted the arrests of Hunt, 
Cashwell, and West, the writer notes that, in another murder in the same area, “[a] 
source said [the victim] was killed in a dispute over a large bag of marijuana that 
[the accused] believed he had stolen.”133  
The other incriminating informants provided different motives than 
Williford’s.  Kenneth West, who would appear as knowledgeable as or more 
knowledgeable than Williford, swore that the reason for the visit to the Matthews 
was that “Roland Matthews . . . and Lisa Matthews owed him money.  Lee Wayne 
told us that he was going to go up there the next night; and that if they did not have 
his money, that he was going quote to take care of them.”134  Goodman’s version 
squares with West’s that the killing was “over drug money.”135  Thompson said 
they were killed because Roland Matthews was a “backstabbing son of a bitch”136 
and because Hunt, Cashwell, and West were concerned that Roland was going to 
give information to the authorities about their drug-selling operation.137 
While each explanation could have been true, they were inconsistent, and all 
were explanations one would pick from a story board on the reasons for a drug-
related murder.  If false, both the ordinariness of the explanations and the variances 
among them would be predictable.  Cashwell’s explanation certainly stands out 
and would not be expected.  Presumably, a liar would not select a version so 
apparently far-fetched. 
 
2. The Curious 
 
Why the State of North Carolina gave Kenneth West such a “sweet deal”138 is 
quite curious.  According to the testimony of Thompson and Williford, upon 
whom the State relied, West was not only present when the killing took place but 
also played an active role in it and mocked the victim.  Thompson’s version was 
that West participated in the act of murder by cutting up Lisa Matthews.139    
                                                                                                                                                   
132 Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 368–69. 
133 Krisher, supra note 29, at 5A. 
134 West Tr., supra note 12, at. 9.  West never indicated that he saw or knew that marijuana 
was in the trash bag carried from the Matthews’ home.  Id. at 11. 
135 Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 561. 
136 Id. at 874.  
137 See id. 
138 He pled to charges that gave him a three-year active sentence, which with time already 
served meant that he would be released no more than two weeks after the plea was entered and be 
placed on probation under a suspended sentence.  See discussion supra note 12. 
139 See id. at 875. 
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Williford stated he said: “Yeah, that fat bitch begged us not to kill her too.”140  
Although it is only one side of a bilateral communication, the letter from West’s 
attorney, Marland Reid, to the prosecutors indicated the prosecutors’ perception of 
real weakness in the case against West.141  The letter corresponds with the light 
sentence West received, but not with the clear guilt of Hunt, which depended on 
statements by the same witnesses who also supported West’s heavy involvement in 
the murders. 
 
3. The Missing 
 
The piece of evidence so clearly missing in this case is the initial story told by 
Williford, the key witness/informant to the authorities, what I call in the title of this 
essay his “first draft.”142  The story line the prosecution supported in the Hunt case 
is that the murders were the work of the drug gang run by Hunt, with Cashwell as 
his employee and others assisting.  Another story, which had a very substantial 
                                                                                                                                                   
140 Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 368. 
141 Letter from Attorney Marland C. Reid, Counsel for West, to Jim Coman and William N. 
Farrell, Jr., Office of the Attorney General (Nov. 19, 1985) (on file with author).  In this letter, Reid 
stated: 
My position was that the first time I discussed this case with you by phone, you 
expressed reservations about Kenny West’s guilt, you acknowledged you had problems 
with Gene Williford’s veracity and you inquired whether Kenny West was willing to take 
the polygraph test. 
. . . Kenny was polygraphed on September 17, 1985, and I furnished those 
polygraph results to you by letter dated September 17, 1985.  When I visited you in your 
office on October 1, 1985, and advised you that Kenny had passed the polygraph test 
administered by the State, you again stated you would have to take another close look at 
the State’s case against Kenny. 
Therefore, during our conversation on October 31, 1985, I anticipated there was a 
real possibility the State would dismiss the charges against Kenny although, as I advised 
you, I realized the implications that would have on the State’s case against the two 
remaining defendants. . . . You advised me if in the course of the trial against Lee Wayne 
Hunt and Jerry Cashwell no evidence came forward to implicate Kenny West, you would 
then do the obvious thing.  By implication, I naturally inferred you would voluntarily 
dismiss all charges against Kenny, although you did not put it in those words. 
Id. at 1–2. 
142 The Alan Gell case is a well-known North Carolina death penalty case that sparked both 
ethics reform regarding the scope of the prosecution’s duty to examine its files for exculpatory 
evidence and helped usher in the state’s full open-file discovery law for all felony cases.  Gell 
involved the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, which resulted in the granting a new trial and Gell’s 
acquittal on retrial when all the evidence was presented.  See Mosteller, supra note 2, at 262–76 
(describing both the case and its impact on changes in the ethics responsibilities of prosecutors and 
enactment of North Carolina’s full open-file discovery law).  Part of the critical exculpatory 
disclosure in the Gell case was one of these “first drafts.”  In it, Crystal Morris, an involved informer, 
told her then boyfriend in a secretly taped telephone conversation that she needed to “make up a 
story” to tell the police.  Joseph Neff, Lawyers Put Focus on Agent, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), 
May 22, 2004 (noting the critical value of the taped conversation for the jury).  See also Answer, at 7, 
N. C. State Bar v. Hoke, 04 DHC 15 (Apr. 23, 2004) para. 8(a), (on file with author). 
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sponsor in Cashwell, is that he, although admittedly an employee of Hunt’s drug-
selling operation, killed the Matthews couple because of his irrational, 
uncontrollable rage, which was entirely unrelated to the drug operation. 
According to Hunt’s witnesses, Cashwell was making statements in the 
community about his own guilt.143  If the version that identified Cashwell as the 
lone murderer who acted for independent and irrational reasons was ever provided 
by any of the witnesses to investigators, one would expect the police to push back.  
The story is both apparently implausible and would disappoint their perhaps 
soundly-based interest in ending Hunt’s drug business by putting him behind bars. 
We have the “first draft” of only one jailhouse informant, Samuel Thompson, 
who mailed his information to the authorities in order to get their attention.  
Williford had contact with the police within a month or so of the murders, and he 
met with the police and a prosecutor in his lawyer’s office in December 1985, 
when he stated that he admitted his involvement in a “roundabout way.”144  His 
statement “I didn’t implication [sic] what I should have”145 is particularly 
tantalizing.  Does he mean that he did not implicate those that he should have, 
meaning those he was expected to implicate?  Williford also was taken out of jail 
confinement by the police numerous times between his February and March 
versions of the story146 (although admittedly in the February version he implicated 
Hunt).  None of Williford’s “drafts” of his story during these police contacts are 
available. 
During the Motion for Appropriate Relief proceedings, Hunt’s counsel filed a 
Motion for Production of Exculpatory Evidence.147  The State responded that “The 
prosecution files pertaining to the prosecutions of defendant and his co-
defendant[s] were archived.  A search of archived files has failed to locate any 
pertinent files.”148  The State cannot find any records!  The discovery rules were 
                                                                                                                                                   
143 As noted earlier, see supra note 69, Hunt and several other witnesses associated with him 
testified that Cashwell said he (Cashwell) committed the murders.  Because of their interest, their 
testimony was subject to a heavy discount.  Cashwell statements to Hughes would have given them 
substantial corroboration.  In his response to the ethics complaint, Hughes stated: “Jerry [Cashwell] 
hated Mr. Hunt because he believed that Mr. Hunt had been responsible for Jerry’s arrest for the 
murders.  He believed that Mr. Hunt had spread the word in the community that Jerry had admitted to 
Mr. Hunt that he, Jerry, had killed Mr. and Ms. Matthews.”  Hughes Response Letter, supra note 5, at 
2. 
144 See Cashwell Tr., supra note 40, at 47. 
145 Id.  This wording is not repeated in the Hunt trial.  There he stated he told the police “[n]ot 
very much of nothing because I wasn’t truthful with them.”  Hunt Tr., supra note 26, at 381.  Note, 
however, that he does not say he told them nothing; rather “[n]ot very much of nothing.”  Id. 
146 See supra note 49. 
147 See Motion for Production of Exculpatory Evidence at 3–5, State v.  Hunt, 85 CRS 16651-
54 (June 3, 2005) (on file with author) (requesting, inter alia, evidence impeaching Williford).   
148 State’s Answer to Defendant’s Motion for Production of Exculpatory Evidence at 1, State 
v. Hunt, Nos. 85 CRS 16551-54 (Aug. 8, 2006) (on file with author).  The motion had attached a two 
sentence letter from the Sheriff of Cumberland County indicating that he could not locate the files 
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different at the time the case was tried than they are today in North Carolina and so 
is the level of concern with convicting the innocent, but the constitutional standard 
has remained constant.  The fact that no records allegedly survive is at least 
troubling and certainly very unfortunate. 
 
IV. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE INFORMANTS CHALLENGE TO THE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
 
A. The Unusual Nature and Inherent Dangers in the Incentives Given for Informer 
Testimony 
 
As I noted in the Introduction, informant testimony plays a significant role in 
prosecution of criminal cases in the United States, and, in many of those cases, it is 
critical to the prosecution securing a conviction.  Yet that reality of need does not 
lessen the problematic nature of such testimony.149  The testimony has been gained 
by the prosecution through explicit promises to benefit the informant if he or she 
testifies in support of the prosecution’s case.150  Except for the fact that such 
practice is historically accepted and commonplace in modern prosecutions, it could 
on its face seem extraordinary in that it incentivizes the informant to tailor his or 
her testimony to satisfy the wishes of a party, the prosecution, to achieve a 
conviction. 
The inherently suspect nature of purchased informer testimony can be seen in 
the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Singleton,151 where a three-judge panel 
ruled the bargain to constitute a violation of the federal bribery statute, a decision 
that was promptly reversed by an en banc decision.152  The statute punishes 
“[w]hoever . . . directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises anything of value 
to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to 
be given by such person as a witness . . . .”153  The en banc court ruled that 
                                                                                                                            
and two affidavits from summer interns that on one day they search the criminal files in two locations 
and found nothing related to Hunt, Cashwell, and West.  Id., Exhibits 1–3. 
149 See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 
PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing that, while payments to witnesses in return for testimony is generally 
considered unethical and illegal, it is permitted for informers and cooperating witnesses and for 
experts, and despite the frequency of use of such witnesses, these incentives create particular 
problems that deserve special scrutiny). 
150 Of course, the government routinely requires that the testimony be truthful, but practically 
that means testifying consistently with what the government believes to be the truth, which is usually 
well known to the informant by the time testimony is given.  See, e.g., United States v. Spriggs, 996 
F.2d 320, 323–24 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (allowing admission of cooperation agreements, which state that 
the government will impose a sanction if the witness lies, and noting that nothing in such agreements 
“enhance the Government’s ability to detect whether [the cooperating witness] is in fact lying”). 
151 144 F.3d 1343, 1358 (10th Cir. 1998). 
152 See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 
U.S. 1024 (1999). 
153 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (2006). 
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“whoever” did not include the United States when acting in its sovereign 
capacity.154  The court also noted the long-standing historical practice of the 
sovereign granting leniency in exchange for testimony against the witness’s 
confederates and others involved in crime.155 
Deeming such bargains bribery may also seem wrong-headed because the 
government is presumably not making the offer for a corrupt purpose, and indeed 
if the prosecutor has behaved ethically, such testimony will only be secured in 
situations where the prosecutor has reached a personal conviction of the 
defendant’s guilt.156  However, the lack of a corrupt motive and a personal belief in 
the merits of the case do not excuse any other party who offers specific rewards for 
factual testimony supporting its position at trial.  Moreover, a prosecutor’s belief in 
guilt obviously does not guarantee that the defendant is guilty.  There is nothing in 
the historical practice of the sovereign offering incentives to cooperating witnesses 
and informers that suggests the government possesses a special ability to discern 
the truth. 
Finally, the incentives offered are frequently extraordinarily powerful.  The 
principal incentive is a promise of liberty.  The offer may be made to someone who 
is presently confined or faces potential incarceration, and the promise of liberty 
may be immediate and full or it may instead shorten what would have been a 
longer period of confinement.  Other incentives may be included, such as contacts 
with family and friends or monetary rewards.157  However, the most frequent 
incentive is liberty, and that promise is incredibly powerful.  
 
B. Empirical Evidence Suggesting the Broad Scope of the Problem of Inaccurate 
Informant Testimony 
 
As noted earlier, a study of the first 200 DNA exonerations revealed that false 
informant testimony was involved in eighteen percent of those cases.158  In an 
earlier study, Barry Scheck and his colleagues found that false testimony from 
informants was involved in twenty-one percent of the sixty-two cases they 
examined where convicted individuals were exonerated by DNA.159  In their study 
of 340 exonerations from 1989 through 2003, Professor Sam Gross and his 
                                                                                                                                                   
154 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1300–01. 
155 Id. at 1301–02. 
156 See Mosteller, supra note 1, at 1365–70 (discussing various formulations of how the 
prosecutor’s duty to do justice translates into an assessment of the defendant’s guilt and noting that 
while many prosecutors operate under the principle that the evidence must convince them of the guilt 
of the defendant, a lesser standard is permitted). 
157 See supra note 8 (describing repudiated testimony by an informant who received a 
substantial financial reward).  Cf.  Shaila Dewan & Brenda Goodman, As Prices Rise, Crime Tipsters 
Work Overtime, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008 at A1 (describing increase in crime solving tips 
apparently in response to a downturn in the economy and the tipsters’ need for funds). 
158 See Garrett, supra note 13. 
159 See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 13.  
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colleagues did not examine the issue of informants separately.  However, their data 
revealed the important role of jailhouse informants in these convictions.  In ninety-
seven of the cases, a civilian witness who claimed no direct involvement in the 
crime, usually a jailhouse informant or another witness who stood to gain from 
testifying, gave false testimony.160  In addition, false testimony was given in a 
number of murder cases, mostly by individuals who participated or claimed to 
have participated in the crimes, and presumably, they were testifying in response to 
inducements by the prosecution.161 
In an investigative story, the Chicago Tribune found that informants or 
“incentivized witnesses” were involved in thirty-eight of the ninety-seven death 
penalty cases where defendants were released or exonerated (39.2%).  This was the 
second most frequent factor in these cases, following incorrect or perjured 
eyewitness testimony (53.5%).  Of these thirty-eight cases, sixteen involved 
“jailhouse informants,”162 who, in the main, appear simply to have fabricated 
confessions by the defendant, and the other twenty-two provided other types of 
testimony.163 
Finally, although not an analysis of general causes of wrongful convictions, 
the revelations surrounding jailhouse informant Leslie Vernon White in Los 
Angeles, California, is perhaps the best known of the class of individual informant 
abuse cases.164  White admitted to numerous acts of perjury in the form of 
fabricated confessions of fellow prisoners, which he exchanged for benefits.  He 
repeatedly peddled false confessions, which he created by a practiced scheme of 
engaging fellow prisoners in conversation about the charges pending against them 
and then through a ruse learning key details from police records to give the 
                                                                                                                                                   
160 See Gross et al., supra note 13.  
The well known North Carolina case of Darryl Hunt illustrates the role of a fabricated 
incriminating statement allegedly made by the defendant in the conviction of an innocent man.  Hunt 
was exonerated after eighteen years in prison for rape and murder when DNA evidence led 
authorities to the real perpetrator, who confessed.  See Richard Willing, Suspects Get Snared by a 
Relative’s DNA, USA TODAY, June 8, 2005, at 1A.  Despite his innocence, an informant who was at 
the time of the crime a fourteen-year-old prostitute, testified that Hunt told her of his involvement in 
the crime.  See State v. Hunt, 457 S.E.2d 276, 284 (N.C. 1995).  The informant’s motivation for 
providing this false confession is unclear although her first conversation with the police occurred 
while she was being detained and tried for prostitution, see State v. Hunt, 378 S.E.2d 754, 756 (N.C. 
1989) which placed her in immediate need of lenient treatment. 
161 See Gross et al., supra note 13, at 543. 
162 This category is discussed below.  See infra Part IV.C.3.i. 
163  John T. Rago, A Fine Line Between Chaos and Creation: Lessons on Innocence Reform 
from the Pennsylvania Eight, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 359, 439 (2006) (citing report by Ken Armstrong 
and Maurice Possley). 
164 See REPORT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: 
FREEING  THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY 65 (Paul Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter ABA REPORT] (describing the White case as “[o]ne of the most notorious examples” of 
the abuses of jailhouse informants). 
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confession the appearance of inside knowledge.165  A related grand jury 
investigation revealed many other acts of perjury by other informants and abuses 
and laxity in the handling and use of informants by police and prosecutors in Los 
Angeles.166 
 
C. The Multiple Elements of the Problem with the Accuracy of Informant 
Testimony 
 
1. The Inherent Forces that Produce both the Need and the Incentives for 
Falsity in Informant Testimony 
 
With the demonstrated unreliability of informants, an obvious thought might 
be to eliminate them from the prosecutorial arsenal, but elimination is 
unfortunately impractical.  Informants are particularly needed to prosecute 
“victimless crimes,” such as drug selling where there is no unhappy outsider to the 
transaction—a victim—who readily hails the police and reveals all he or she 
knows.  Also, criminals of all types do not voluntarily reveal their criminality, and 
they often go to great lengths to disguise and conceal their actions.  To solve and 
prosecute many cases, the police often need the help of insiders who inform on the 
activities and who testify against those in the enterprise. 
The inducements to informers may be justified on several grounds.  One 
justification is to overcome the informant’s fear of retribution.  Major criminal 
figures obviously do not want their criminality revealed and may be expected to 
use violence against those who would inform.  Thus, someone revealing 
information about a powerful and dangerous criminal may demand physical 
protection and also require a positive inducement in order to endure the anticipated 
costs of testifying. 
For informers who are also targets of prosecution, the incentives must 
outweigh the consequences of providing self-incriminating information.  The 
informant must calculate that the threat to liberty is reduced by cooperation, which 
often requires the dismissal of a large number of potential charges in exchange for 
admission of involvement in some criminal acts. 
The size of the incentive also often relates to the value of the information 
provided to the prosecution’s case.  Prosecutors “pay” more for information 
perceived as highly valuable, and one key ingredient of value is the prosecutor’s 
need for the evidence.167  This presents one of the inherently problematic features 
                                                                                                                                                   
165 See ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING 64–65 (2002) (describing White’s scheme). 
166 See ABA REPORT, supra note 164; BLOOM, supra note 5, at 65–66; Myrna S. Raeder, See 
No Evil:Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse 
Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1413, 1448–49 (2007).  
167 Other components besides need can also go into the prosecutor’s calculation of the value of 
the testimony.  For example, witnesses who are more deeply involved in the crime can often provide 
more extensive and therefore more valuable information than those at the periphery.  See Nekima 
Levy-Pounds, From the Frying Pan Into the Fire How Poor Women of Color and Children are 
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of informant testimony.  If prosecutors and police could prove the charges against 
their target without the informant, they would have no need to “pay” at all and 
certainly no need to provide strong incentives.  Thus, the evidence the informant 
can provide must be additional to the evidence available to the prosecution without 
the informant.  Here we have the reason why corroboration and independent proof 
are often lacking and why such a corroboration requirement has its limits.  The 
informant is most needed when he or she is providing otherwise unprovable facts, 
which thus cannot be corroborated. 
Prosecutorial authorities may lack independent knowledge or evidence of a 
portion of the critical events or actors, but they likely have a version of these facts 
that they believe or expect to be true.  The most readily accepted information will 
be that which is consistent with the facts already known or assumed.  Informants 
have a clear interest in pleasing those who control their freedom, and if they can 
discern the expectations and needs of the authorities, their self-interest mandates 
that they tailor their stories along the anticipated and desired lines.  Strong 
incentives lead to risks of distorted information and false testimony.  In particular, 
there is clear potential for these incentives to produce false evidence implicating 
those “believed” to be guilty of the crimes and for informants to embellish the 
responsibility of those they implicate. 
 
2. Important But Limited Prosecution Tools to Guard Against False Informant 
Testimony 
 
The tools at the prosecutor’s disposal to protect against misuse of informant 
testimony are important but limited.168  They start with the fundamental 
requirement of good motivation—to do justice—by the prosecutor, which is 
essential if the justice system is to have any reasonable prospect of reaching 
accurate outcomes in difficult cases.  However, such motivation must be in one 
respect quite specific: it must be not only to do justice in general, but also to 
convict only those guilty of the particular crime at issue.   
As a matter of utilitarian calculus, one might argue that it is not clearly wrong 
to convict a generally dangerous criminal for a specific crime that he or she 
happened not to commit.  Developing all the arguments against such a position is 
                                                                                                                            
Affected by Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 285, 313 
(2007) (noting that sometimes those with greater involvement can reap larger benefits in terms of 
leniency because of their more extensive and therefore more valuable information). 
168 In particular, one of the critical protections in the current system (and two of my proposals 
for reform) relies on prosecutors to determine that the informant is not credible.  Unfortunately, even 
professionals who typically make truth-determination judgments are not particularly accurate.  See 
Paul C. Giannelli, Brady and Jailhouse Snitches, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 593, 602–03 (2007) 
(discussing study results that accuracy rates range from 52.8% for college students to 64% for Secret 
Service agents in separating true from false stories). 
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not the burden of this paper.169  However, I believe three major reasons demand a 
contrary position.  First, ours is a nation of laws with many detailed specifications 
of that basic concept found in procedural protections such as the jury trial right and 
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  These guarantees depend 
upon the specification in advance of a crime and the requirement of proof that the 
defendant committed it.  Second, what we “know” to be generally true about an 
individual, for example about his dangerous character, may not be true at all.  The 
requirement that the government prove a specific act done at a specific time by a 
specific individual helps to limit reliance on assumption, stereotyping, and rumor.  
Third, often, as in the Hunt case, orders of magnitude separate what is generally 
“known”—that he was a marijuana dealer—and what is presumed—that he 
masterminded the murder of two people.  Spending one’s natural life in prison is 
an appropriate sentence for a double murder, but it is far out of proportion for 
marijuana dealing.170 
If the motivation is to convict a person who the prosecutor believes is guilty 
of some or many crimes but not necessarily guilty of the crime at issue, the system 
breaks down.  Likewise, the prosecutor may not fully test evidence of guilt on a 
particular case because prior crimes and reputation create an assumption of guilt.  
For a case like Hunt’s, where the investigative authorities apparently strongly 
believed he was both a major drug dealer and deeply involved in violence, the 
danger of lessened scrutiny about the merits of the murder charges was very real. 
The next tool is the good judgment of prosecutors in combination with their 
skill and experience in assessing accurately informants’ assertions.171  Informants 
are highly motivated to help themselves; they are frequently substantial criminals 
who lack normal compunctions against lying; and they may be experienced in 
                                                                                                                                                   
169 See D. Michael Risinger, Innocent Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful 
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 763–68, 794–99 (2007) (describing the debate 
between those who consider wrongful convictions rare and resist reforms that might reduce the rate 
of convicting the innocent, because of its potential impact also to free the guilty and those who place 
special weight on the horror of convicting the innocent and attempting to develop methodology for 
evaluating the tradeoff inherent in reforms). 
170 Professor Risinger speculates that the public would react strongly against convicting those 
who are not innocents when the crime for which they were erroneously convicted is much more 
severe than the crimes they have committed previously but not be much bothered where the 
defendant has committed similar crimes.  Id. at 792–94. 
171 Unfortunately, as noted earlier, see supra note 168, most humans are relatively inept at 
determining deception.  Moreover, prosecutors’ assessments are typically affected by a range of 
factors that tend to cause them to accept informant stories even when unreliable.  See Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and 
Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 942–48, 950–52, 962–63 (1999) (describing results of a 
study based primarily on interviews about the cooperation process with former assistant federal 
prosecutors and defense attorneys, which revealed a number of impediments to accurate assessment 
including unwarranted trust, development of a rigid concept of the case, cultural barriers, and lack of 
training).  See also Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, Deception, and Credibility: Confident 
but Erroneous, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809 (2002) (describing various problems with human detection 
of deception, including false confidence and reliance on erroneous cues). 
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deception.  As will be discussed later, while the prosecutor has the responsibility to 
exercise good judgment regarding the informant, he or she is not acting alone.  
Police and other investigative authorities are often intermediaries between the 
prosecutor and informants.  Those intermediaries are no doubt often greatly helpful 
in securing justice in individual cases, but they can also act in extremely 
detrimental ways at times.  Therefore, the prosecutor must be motivated 
figuratively “to look a gift horse in the mouth” when dealing with informants, and 
he or she must have the skill and the perseverance sometimes to overcome 
hindrance by the investigators who likely had primary initial contact with the 
informant. 
Finally, the prosecutor must exercise due diligence in the search for 
corroborating evidence.  Such corroboration provides the most powerful protection 
against erroneous informant testimony—information or evidence that either 
verifies or contradicts the informant’s version.  In some cases, adequate 
corroboration will be available.  For example, the prosecutor may have learned that 
the defendant committed a murder from numerous uninvolved eyewitnesses who 
are unwilling to testify because of fear of retribution.172  Unfortunately, however, 
in many of the most problematic situations, full corroboration will be unavailable, 
and, as developed above, this state of affairs is almost an inherent part of the 
informer problem.  Prosecution need is not always related to a lack of 
corroborating information, but the most substantial incentives will often be given 
to informants where corroboration of a critical link—was this particular defendant 
involved in this particular transaction or involved as the leader rather than as a 
participant—is lacking.  Thus, in some especially problematic cases, the danger 
remains that this highly incentivized testimony from undependable criminals will 
be uncorroborated and false. 
 
3. Types of Informants 
 
Informants are usefully divided into two categories.  In one group are 
jailhouse informants; the second includes all other informants, who are most 
commonly co-participants in the crime or other members of the suspect’s criminal 
group.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
172 Also, corroboration, although not necessarily something that would be admissible evidence, 
can come from other credible sources such as frequently accurate informants.  Sometimes such 
informants are the source of vindication of an innocent person when an informant, who has no 
interest in the case, reveals information that another person committed the crime.  See, e.g., Edmund 
H. Mahony, Judge Frees Man in ’60s Mob Case, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 6, 2001, at A1 
(describing how the discovery of an informants’ statements that another man committed the murder 
for which several men had been confined for decades led to a new trial, a motion supported by the 
prosecution). 
2009] THE SPECIAL THREAT OF INFORMANTS  
 
555 
i. Jailhouse Informants 
 
The typical story from a jailhouse informant is that, while in custody, the 
defendant made an incriminating statement to the informant.  Judge Stephen Trott 
of the Ninth Circuit, writing from his experience as a prosecutor said, “Sometimes 
these snitches tell the truth, but more often they invent testimony and stray details 
out of the air . . . .”173  
Although sharing similarities with other informants, jailhouse informants 
generally present the dangers at a consistently higher degree.  They are by 
definition incarcerated (hence the term “jailhouse”), and as a result, all such 
informers have a strong interest in securing their freedom, which is in the 
government’s control.  Probably more important to their suspect classification is 
the high degree of difficulty in most cases of corroborating or refuting the truth of 
what such informers claim they were told.  The role is an easy one to play in that 
virtually anyone could invent a plausible story.   
Moreover, these informers typically self-identify from what is often a 
relatively large group that is limited only by those who plausibly were in contact 
with the defendant.  Pretenders can be weeded out based on giving an implausible 
account of an incriminating statement, but this limitation is often more apparent 
than real.  The informant can always say that the defendant said “he is guilty” or 
some other conclusory statement, to the effect “he did it.” 
The more detail in the incriminating statement allegedly made by the target, 
the greater the chance for contradiction by the real facts of the case.  As a result, 
detailed jailhouse confessions have some controls on accuracy.  However, making 
sure that a highly motivated informant did not have alternative sources of 
information is often a daunting task.  This has been shown by individual cases of 
admitted informants,174 and certainly the source of the information is becoming 
more difficult to identify in some cases because details of the crime, which were 
previously known only to a few, are now available through the internet.175 
 
ii. Informants Drawn from Crime Co-Participants or Members of the 
Suspect’s Criminal Group 
 
One important difference between jailhouse informants and other types of 
informants is that the latter is limited to a smaller, more selective group of crime 
associates and that limitation provides at least some indirect support for the 
                                                                                                                                                   
173 Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1394 (1996). 
174 See supra accompanying text notes 164–66 (discussing Leslie Vernon White case) 
175 See Valerie Alter, Jailhouse Informants: A Lesson in E-Snitching, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 
223, 228–31 (2005) (demonstrating in well-publicized trial information, availability of details of the 
crime on the internet, which would have provided apparent confirmation for the truthfulness of the 
informant because of his extensive knowledge of the crime). 
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informant’s basic story.  Their ranks are restricted to a small number of individuals 
who can plausibly claim that they had contact with the crime suspect while he was 
engaged in crime.  Moreover, these other informants do not typically self-identify 
and seek out the authorities but instead attempt to avoid exposure because it may 
lead to their own prosecution. 
This class of informants also differs in that their stories are not as frequently 
entire fabrications.  Instead, when lies are told, they more commonly fit into a 
pattern of the informant describing a crime largely accurately but changing the 
roles or identities of the individuals who committed crime.  One of the most 
common alterations is for an involved informant to describe a crime accurately but 
to diminish his or her own role and enhance that of others.  Such stories nicely 
mesh with the prosecution’s typical goal of gathering evidence against a “big fish” 
by securing the testimony of “little fish,” whose criminal liability they reduce or 
extinguish.  One major fault line for prosecutors, which reveals that the process has 
been subverted, is when they turn out to have made a deal with a “big fish” to 
secure the conviction of those lower down in the operation.176 
Unfortunately, if the informant was involved in the crime or has talked with 
those who were, then he or she has the information to present or to reformulate to 
fit the needs of the situation.  The prosecutor is generally not in a position to know 
how the informant may have altered the facts and thus can be misused by the 
informant.  Prosecutors can also be misled by the police.  Because investigators 
rather than prosecutors generally have the initial contact with the individuals who 
become informants, critical alterations in the informants’ stories may occur 
without the prosecutor’s knowledge, which effectively hides from the prosecutor’s 
scrutiny key data for evaluating informants’ veracity. 
As noted above, if it were practically possible, informants should only be used 
when their stories are fully corroborated.  Also, if it were possible, a procedural 
protection might be used to partially compensate for the lack of corroboration: 
those having contact with the informant, like the investigator in a “double blind” 
experiment, would not know what response is desired.177 
Yet the world of informants is not “blind” in the experimental sense at all.  
Instead, those who have first contact with the informant—the police or other 
investigative personnel—sometimes have personal relationships with the 
informant.  Quite often they have preconceptions and/or some knowledge of how 
the crime occurred.  Also, they will generally have a sense who the “bad actors” in 
                                                                                                                                                   
176 In his well received article, Judge Stephen Trott of the Ninth Circuit writes from his 
experience as a prosecutor in dealing with informants.  He argues persuasively for the importance of 
only dealing with “small fish” to get “big” ones and both to drive a hard deal and to be sure that the 
prosecutor stays in control.  See Trott, supra note 173, at 1392–94.  
177 In some jurisdictions, an aspect of the “double blind” experimental regime is being brought 
into criminal law investigation in eyewitness identification procedures.  See Mosteller, supra note 1, 
at 1392 (discussing the set of reforms in identification procedures).  Among these is the mandate that 
the officials who administer the identification procedure, if possible, lack knowledge of which of the 
individuals appearing in the procedure are suspect(s).  Id. 
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the community are and the “usual suspects” for the type of crime at issue.  
Accordingly, those having contact with the informant typically have both the 
ability and some inclination to help the informant shape the story line in a 
particular direction.  They may act inadvertently in supplying information, but they 
may also push the informant to tell what they believe is the accurate version of 
events.  In either situation, one source of data in the informant’s story may be 
investigating officers who sought to “turn” into a cooperating witness a person 
who likely began by denying any knowledge or involvement and only gradually 
moved to recite the version that the investigator believed all along to be the truth.  
I accept that the source of the informant’s information is not likely 
controllable and that it is not realistic to substitute the rules of scientific inquiry for 
the multi-dimensional role of crime investigator.  However, when the informant’s 
story has changed after contact with government agents, efforts should be made to 
preserve the remnants of the story’s transformation to help sort truth from lies and 
inaccuracies produced by the distorting effect of powerful incentives.  
 
4. Constitutional Doctrines Particularly Relevant to Informants  
 
The chief constitutional provisions that may be violated by informants and 
their testimony are of two types, which sometimes overlap.  First, if the testimony 
is perjured and is either the responsibility of the prosecution or known to it, due 
process is violated under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Napue v. Illinois.178  
However, if the perjury is entirely the work of a private individual, it is generally 
covered only under the concept of newly discovered evidence or more broadly a 
claim of actual innocence, which may face special procedural hurdles.179 
Second, if the prosecution fails to disclose the existence of inducements 
offered to obtain the informants testimony or misreports the extent of those 
inducements, due process is also violated under the Court’s ruling in Giglio v. 
United States.180  This error may overlap with the first and also become a Napue 
violation if the informant and/or the police not only fail to report but also falsely 
testify about the inducement offered. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
178 360 U.S. 264 (1959).  See infra note 208 for a discussion of whether the prosecutor must 
know of the perjury rather than another government agent. 
179 Also, a limited and somewhat uncertain constitutional doctrine applies to actual innocence 
claims in death penalty cases.  See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (ruling that petitioner “made 
the stringent showing required by the actual-innocence exception” to the procedural bar rule and that 
his federal habeas case could therefore proceed). 
180 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  Giglio held that failure to provide information regarding an 
agreement with the government regarding future prosecution was important to credibility and failure 
to produce it violated due process.  Id. at 153–55 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).  In 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985), the Supreme Court characterized its ruling in 
Giglio to be that “[i]mpeachment evidence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady 
rule,” rejecting a distinction between exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence.   
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V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
 
In Achieving Justice: Freeing the Innocent, Convicting the Guilty,181 the ABA 
Criminal Justice Section sets out a number of proposals relevant to the use of 
informants: (1) prosecutorial screening of informant’s reliability;182 (2) imposing a 
                                                                                                                                                   
181 See ABA REPORT, supra note 164. 
182 A Canadian Commission investigating the wrongful conviction of Guy Paul Morin (cleared 
by DNA evidence) based on his alleged confession to a murder made to a jailhouse informant and 
supposedly overheard by a second informant provided the following list of factors that should 
comprise the prosecutor’s review: 
(1) The extent to which the statement is confirmed . . . ;  
(2) The specificity of the alleged statement.  For example, a claim that the accused said “I 
killed A.B.” is easy to make but extremely difficult for any accused to disprove;  
(3) The extent to which the statement contains details or leads to the discovery of 
evidence known only to the perpetrator;  
(4) The extent to which the statement contains details which could reasonably be 
accessed by the in-custody informer, other than through inculpatory statements by the 
accused . . . . [The prosecutor] should be mindful that, historically, some informers have 
shown great ingenuity in securing information thought to be unaccessible to them.  
Furthermore, some informers have converted details communicated by the accused in the 
context of an exculpatory statement into details which purport to prove the making of an 
inculpatory statement;  
(5) The informer’s general character, which may be evidenced by his or her criminal 
record or other disreputable or dishonest conduct known to the authorities;  
(6) Any request the informer has made for benefits or special treatment (whether or not 
agreed to) and any promises which may have been made (or discussed with the informer) 
by a person in authority in connection with the provision of the statement or an 
agreement to testify;  
(7) Whether the informer has, in the past, given reliable information to the authorities;  
(8) Whether the informer has previously claimed to have received statements while in 
custody.  This may be relevant not only to the informer’s reliability or unreliability but, 
more generally, to the issue whether the public interest would be served by utilizing a 
recidivist informer who previously traded information for benefits;  
(9) Whether the informer has previously testified in any court proceeding, whether as a 
witness for the prosecution or the defence or on his or her behalf, and any findings in 
relation to the accuracy and reliability of that evidence, if known;  
(10) Whether the informer made some written or other record of the words allegedly 
spoken by the accused and, if so, whether the record was made contemporaneous to the 
alleged statement of the accused;  
(11) The circumstances under which the informer’s report of the alleged statement was 
taken (e.g. report made immediately after the statement was made, report made to more 
than one officer, etc.);  
(12) The manner in which the report of the statement was taken by the police (e.g. 
through use of non-leading questions, thorough report of words spoken by the accused, 
thorough investigation of circumstances which might suggest opportunity or lack of 
opportunity to fabricate a statement);  
(13) Any other known evidence that may attest to or diminish the credibility of the 
informer, including the presence or absence of any relationship between the accused and 
the informer;  
(14) Any relevant information contained in any available registry of informers. 
Fred Kaufman, Ont. Ministry of the Attorney Gen., Report of the Kaufman Commission on 
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requirement that the informant’s evidence must be corroborated;183 (3) enhanced 
discovery of any deals, both explicit and implicit, reached with the informant;184 
and (4) a carefully crafted cautionary instruction for the jury.185  This is a helpful 
summary list, which others have embellished and modified.186  
Professor Alexandra Natapoff, an insightful critic of informant abuses, argues 
for increased openness of three types: (1) greater discovery regarding the 
background of the informant and the details of any prior versions; (2) holding 
reliability hearings comparable to Daubert187 hearings to help determine the 
likelihood of fabrication and whether the testimony is so unreliable that it should 
be excluded;188 and (3) providing for pre-trial depositions of such witnesses.189  
                                                                                                                            
Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin: Recommendations 13–15 (1998), 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/morin/morin_recom.pdf 
(Recommendation No. 41).  Recommendation 39 states: “Confirmation should be defined as credible 
evidence or information, available to the Crown, independent of the in-custody informer, which 
significantly supports the position that the inculpatory aspects of the proposed evidence were not 
fabricated.  One in-custody informer does not provide confirmation for another.”  Id., 
Recommendation No. 39.  
Professor Raeder argues for the need for vigorous screening of jailhouse informants by the 
prosecution.  She notes that such a process was undertaken by the Los Angeles prosecutor’s office 
after a scandal and investigation regarding a particularly effective and nefarious informant, Leslie 
Vernon White and that similar and even more extensive reforms were undertaken in Canada after a 
similar experience with wrongful convictions.  See Raeder, supra note 166, at 1448–50. 
183 Professor Raeder argues that as to jailhouse informants, empirical evidence indicating their 
unreliability means that the burden of proving truthfulness should be on the prosecution.  She appears 
to support the adoption of an ethical standard for a corroboration requirement, but more clearly 
supports the adoption of an internal review process by the prosecutor’s office, which she notes 
resulted in Los Angeles in a dramatic cut in jailhouse informant use.  See Raeder, supra note 166, at 
1437–38. 
184 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 2000), adopted a particularly robust set of special discovery rules for jailhouse informant 
cases.  See also Giannelli, supra note 168, at 604–09 (discussing various discovery proposals in the 
jailhouse informant context). 
185 ABA REPORT, supra note 154, at 67–77.  See also Steven Skurka, A Canadian Perspective 
on the Role of Cooperators and Informants, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 760–61 (2002) (describing use 
of “clear and sharp” warning in Canadian courts). 
186 See generally Symposium, The Cooperating Witness Conundrum: Is Justice Obtainable?, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 747 (2002).  One specific proposal that could have been implicated by the Hunt 
case but was not because of the jury’s decision not to recommend the death penalty is the elimination 
of the death penalty option when it would rest upon the testimony of informants.  See Steven Clark, 
Procedural Reforms in Capital Cases Applied to Perjury, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 453, 462–63 
(2001) (proposing that life be the maximum sentence when testimony of informants must be relied 
upon). 
187 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring federal judges to 
function as “gatekeepers” to prevent admission of scientific expertise that lacks scientific validity and 
therefore evidentiary reliability). 
188 The type of reliability hearing that she suggests generally be applied to informants has been 
adopted by Illinois through legislation dealing with jailhouse informants.  See Alexandra Natapoff, 
Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
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She supports other additional measures, which she characterizes as increasing 
democratic accountability.  These include providing public information about 
informant uses and activities190 and restricting the rewards available to 
informants.191   
Within these proposals are a number of important measures.  For my 
treatment of them, I distill them into two basic categories: (1) revealing the content 
of the informant’s testimony, including the conversations with the informant and 
variations in the informant’s story and (2) the nature of the deal, including details 
of all promises made and inducements offered to informants. 
 
A. The Content of the Informant’s Testimony 
 
In various ways, scholars have argued for documentation of the meetings held 
with informants, the evidence received, and benefits promised.192  A frequent 
suggestion is that “[i]nterrogations of informants by investigators should be 
recorded—preferably videotaped, but if that is not possible, audio taped—and the 
tapes should be accessible to the defense under normal discovery rules.”193  
Professor Bennett Gershman identifies three classes of witnesses as particularly 
                                                                                                                            
107, 112–15 (2006) citing 725 Ill. Comp. Stat., 5/115-21 (2003). 
189 Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 645, 698–700 (2004).  
190 Others have recommended creation of national and local registries of informants and for the 
potential to “black list” and monitor “recidivist” informants.  See Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a 
Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REV. 337, 367 
(2006).  Alexandra Natapoff argues in general for more prosecutorial oversight of the process of 
creating or “flipping” an informant.  See Natapoff, supra note 189, at 674–76. 
191 Natapoff, Supra note 189 at 700–02.  She also argues for public debate and legislative 
involvement in the use of informants.  Id. at 703. 
192 See Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and 
Suggestions for Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 140 (1994). 
193 Rago, supra note 163, at 438.  See also Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by 
Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 829, 861–62 (2002); George C. Harris, supra note 149, at 62; 
Michael S. Ross, Thinking Outside the Box: How the Enforcement of Ethical Rules Can Minimize the 
Dangers of Prosecutorial Leniency and Immunity Deals, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 875, 888 (2002) 
(proposing that “the information proffered by the defendant and defense counsel should be the 
subject of accurate and intelligible notes by the prosecutor or agent present”); Jannice E. Joseph, 
Article, The New Russian Roulette: Brady Revisited, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 33, 48 (2004) (proposing 
“memorialization of witness rehearsal sessions”); Sam Roberts, Note, Should Prosecutors Be 
Required to Record Their Pretrial Interviews with Accomplices and Snitches?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
257, 287–302 (2005) (proposing reform through disciplinary rule). 
Judge Trott argues for recording, but counsels care in the method.  He argues that the full 
extent of the preliminary understanding be put in writing and signed by the informant and that the 
prosecutor should probe for “‘side-deals’ with the police.”  See Trott, supra note 173, at 1402–03.  
On the other hand, he argues for care in drafting the agreement document, because it “may come back 
to haunt [the prosecutor] if it badly drafted,” and he gives a disappointingly weak justification for not 
recording the negotiation: “Do not negotiate on tape.  Transcribing the tapes may drive you to 
distraction.  At the same time, do not try to hide anything.”  Id. at 1402. 
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vulnerable to coercive or suggestive interviewing techniques,194 but considers the 
cooperating witness “the most dangerous prosecution witness of all.”195  This is 
because the witness is both subject to manipulation but also often eager to lie or 
embellish on his or her own and is frequently capable of both developing and 
testifying to a convincing fabricated story.196  He contends that conversations with 
informants should be videotaped.197 
Professor John Rago has also argued that sworn statements should be taken 
from prospective informants so that when shown to be false, independent special 
prosecutors could be appointed to prosecute the informant for perjury.198  Others 
argue that informants should be required by the prosecution to undergo lie detector 
testing.199 
 
B. The Nature of the Deal 
 
Professor Michael Cassidy examined another part of the problem: the 
purposeful vagueness of inducements either as a way to claim disclosure is 
unnecessary because no real promise of leniency was made or to reduce the 
effectiveness of defense impeachment because the inducement revealed is 
indefinite and arguably less powerful.200  He notes that while Giglio v. United 
States201 requires the disclosure of a promise, reward, or inducement to a 
government witness under the Due Process Clause as exculpatory evidence, the 
exact dimensions of when non-explicit promises are covered has not been clearly 
established.202  On the one hand, in Boone v. Paderick,203 the Fourth Circuit ruled 
that  
 
rather than weakening the significance for credibility purposes of an 
agreement of favorable treatment, tentativeness may increase its 
                                                                                                                                                   
194 See Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 829, 
844 (2002) (including children, eyewitnesses, and cooperating witnesses).  As noted below, I accept 
that taping the audio portion of the transaction is sufficient because of the law enforcement concerns 
that informants will be identified through misuse of videotape contacts.  See infra note 218.  
195 Id. at 847. 
196 See id. at 848. 
197 See id. at 861–62.  But see infra note 218 (accepting that audio taping is sufficient). 
198 See Rago, supra note 163, at 438. 
199 See Aaron M. Clemens, Note, Removing the Market for Lying Snitches: Reforms to Prevent 
Unjust Convictions, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 151, 234–42 (2004).  Professor Raeder notes that the 
California Department of Justice Division of Criminal Law policy is that passing a polygraph test is a 
factor in determining whether to employ a jailhouse informant.  See Raeder, supra note 166, at 1449.  
200 See R. Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the 
Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129, 1169 (2004). 
201 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
202 See Cassidy, supra note 200, at 1151. 
203 541 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1976). 
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relevancy.  This is because a promise to recommend leniency (without 
assurance of it) may be interpreted by the promisee as contingent upon 
the quality of the evidence produced [and] the more uncertain the 
agreement, the greater the incentive to make the testimony pleasing to 
the promisor.204   
 
On the other hand, numerous decisions from other lower federal courts have 
found that failure to reveal such vague promises does not violate Giglio.205 
Cassidy argues for three reforms: (1) a broad interpretation of Giglio to 
include such implied inducement; (2) amending the Rules of Professional Conduct 
to include the broader Giglio obligation in a ethical rule; and (3) an expanded on 
the record inquiry with cooperating accomplice witnesses at the time their guilty 
pleas are entered.206  As to the ethical rule, he proposes to add the requirement that 
the prosecution disclose “‘all promises, rewards and inducements made by agents 
of the government to government witnesses’” and that “inducements” be defined 
as “‘any statement which reasonably implies that the government is likely to confer 
or withhold future advantages depending on the witness’s cooperation.’”207 
Cassidy accepts that this disciplinary rule would not reach the conduct of the 
police directly and would not require the prosecutor to conduct an inquiry of the 
police as to whether such inducements were offered.208 
In order to help eliminate post-conviction disputes as to whether Giglio was 
violated, he also supports a requirement that prosecutors be required to formalize 
their inducements with cooperating witnesses in writing.209  He argues such a 
                                                                                                                                                   
204 Id. at 451. 
205 See Cassidy, supra note 200, at 1152.  Cassidy contends that unlike the Giglio prohibition, 
which applies to promises by all government agents regardless of the prosecutor’s specific knowledge 
of those promises, the prohibition against presentation of false testimony under Napue applies only if 
“the prosecutor knows the testimony is false”.  See id. at 1163 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S., 
269).  Perhaps Cassidy is making the narrow point that some government agent must know of the 
perjury, but if perjury is known to a government agent, such as a police officer rather than a 
prosecutor, due process should still be violated.  See, e.g., Thompson v. Garrison, 516 F.2d 986, 988 
(4th Cir. 1975) (stating in dicta that it is sufficient for habeas corpus relief if “the prosecutor or other 
government officers knew the testimony in question was false”). 
206 See Cassidy supra note 200 at 1166. 
207 Id. at 1171. 
208 See id. at 1171 n.232.  He argues that until the ethical rules require that “reasonable efforts” 
be made to ensure that evidence negating guilt generally be discovered by the prosecutor, no such 
requirement should be imposed in this area.  Such a requirement of reasonable inquiry has been 
recommended by Professor Stanley Fisher, see Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to 
Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379, 
1424 (2000), and that general requirement of “diligent inquiry” has been incorporated into the North 
Carolina ethics rules.  N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2006). 
209 Cassidy, supra note 200, at 1172–73.  Such a requirement of formal statement is supported 
by the Illinois GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Report rec. 50, at 120 (2002); FRED 
C. KAUFMAN, Q.C., REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL MORIN rec. 43, 
at 608–09 (Ontario commission report).  Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127a (West 2004) (requiring 
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requirement would avoid the confusion that occurs when the prosecutor contends 
no inducement was made but the cooperating witness believes there was an 
agreement. 
Finally, Cassidy argues that when a guilty plea is entered the court should, 
“on the record and under oath,” determine whether any promises or inducements 
were made to the witness by government agents.  He proposes a standard two-part 
inquiry: first whether the witness has been called or anticipates being called by the 
government as a witness in any criminal case, and if so, whether anyone from the 
government has made any representations to the defendant regarding possible 
leniency on the charges?210  If none are disclosed, he contends the prosecution’s 
position would be strengthened in any subsequent Giglio inquiry.  If it turns out 
that promises had been made and they were not fully divulged in any earlier 
proceeding where the informant testified, both legal remedies for the defense and 
disciplinary actions could be pursued.211  
 
VI. THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF “INDEPENDENT” EVIDENCE OF GUILT OR AT 
LEAST INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMANT DOMINATED CASES 
 
In Achieving Justice, the ABA Criminal Justice Section adopted the resolution 
that “no prosecution should occur based solely upon uncorroborated jailhouse 
informant testimony.”212  The resolution applies only to jailhouse informants, but 
independent evidence of guilt is important for any conviction that critically 
depends on informer’s testimony.  The difficulty is how to make a corroboration 
requirement work in a real world that has practical need to convict the guilty as 
well as protect the innocent.  The ABA resolution reduces the challenge to 
effective prosecution, which often must depend on informers for some critical 
element of proof, by limiting its reach to arguably the most problematic cases. 
For all informers, I suggest four remedies.  While substantial, these proposals 
are more modest than many of the suggested remedies made by academics and 
critics for two reasons.  First, I have chosen to deal with a difficult class of cases: 
ones where the defendant may well have committed some criminal acts and non-
jailhouse informers testify.  Second, the literature on informants is rich and has 
identified a wide range of promising reforms.  The challenge is not to identify 
promising ideas and indeed sound remedies but with making them manageable and 
getting them implemented.  The misuse of informants is a major threat to justice 
that is not easily remedied.  It is time to start moving forward with concrete 
reforms, and my proposals are pitched to be both helpful and realistic. 
                                                                                                                            
prosecutors to file with the court a “written statement setting out any and all consideration promised 
to, or received by,” jailhouse informants, which does not include witnesses who witnessed and/or 
participated in the crime). 
210 Id. at 1174–76. 
211 See id. at 1176. 
212 ABA REPORT, supra note 164, at 63. 
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My four proposals are to require the following: (1) documenting of all 
conversations by government agents with potential informants through at least 
substantial notes, and mechanical recording of all conversations with jailhouse 
informants and conversations with all other informants once they have agreed to 
cooperate; (2) both producing a written statement of all promises and inducements 
of whatever type from all governmental agents and conducting an on-the-record 
judicial inquiry before the informant testifies to confirm the accuracy of the written 
form as to agreements and/or expectations of leniency; (3) developing a 
mechanism in each prosecutor’s office for independent review of all cases where 
informant testimony of whatever type provides the only direct evidence of a 
defendant’s guilt;213 and (4) in this same group of cases, providing an independent 
prosecutorial review of post-conviction claims of innocence when fact-based 
claims of innocence are made that are facially plausible and if verified would 
create a reasonable likelihood of innocence. 
The above proposals are of two types: further discovery and disclosure, which 
merely but importantly develops and reveals information that in the main is already 
constitutionally required but presently is too frequently not provided to the defense 
because it is unavailable, and two occasions for additional review by independent 
prosecutorial agents of the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt.  The first type of 
proposals is specific and largely statutory, encompassing disclosure of information 
about the development of the informant’s story and the details of the inducements 
promised and perceived.214  The Constitution recognizes that substantially 
inconsistent versions of an important prosecutorial witness’ incriminating claims 
must in fairness be disclosed.  More specific to the informant’s situation, due 
process also recognizes that the strong inducements involved in procuring much of 
                                                                                                                                                   
213 I define the group as those where the only direct evidence of guilt comes from informants, 
which may be too narrow.  Perhaps it should be those cases where the primary evidence of guilt 
comes from informants.  I do not think I mean it to be quite that broad because it will likely water 
down the intensity of the review, which should be a searching inquiry because the case is in an 
especially suspect group.  However, at the same time I intend the class of cases subject to review to 
be relatively narrow; a case should not be excluded simply because there appears to be some minor 
corroborating evidence.  Corroboration often is apparent rather than real or may not be truly 
independent of the informant’s information, and so the presence of any corroborating evidence 
should not be sufficient to eliminate review. 
214 It is useful to note that the other area in which witnesses are paid, expert testimony, has 
long been subject to enhanced disclosure requirements in criminal cases.  See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE 
ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.3(f) (3d ed. 2007) (describing generally applicable criminal 
discovery procedures that include experts).  The principal justifications for disclosure were not 
related to the payment but because the expert’s testimony was presumed not likely to be swayed by 
being disclosed in advance of trial to the opponent and because advanced disclosure is necessary to 
effective cross-examination of the expert.  However, in pre-Daubert days, those who criticized the 
excesses of expert testimony under the “junk science” label argued for greater discovery and in 
particular more information about the experts and their compensation agreements.  See Paul C. 
Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Case, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 125 (1993) 
(quoting from an argument by Vice President Dan Quayle that appeared in Criminal Justice Reform, 
41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 566 (1992), an article focused on discovery of experts in civil litigation). 
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this testimony may affect the testimony and require their disclosure.215  The 
statutory disclosure provisions I propose concretely develop and record the 
information already constitutionally required.  Also, they focus on providing that 
disclosure in time for presentation to the jury.  My proposals means that the 
constitutionally required information would be recorded when it is most available 
and delivered when it is most needed to arrive at a correct verdict rather than 
resting on attempts to remedy failures of justice long after an erroneous conviction 
from evidence that may no longer exist. 
The second type of proposals requires special prosecutorial review at two 
points in some cases involving informants.  For those who would ask why 
informant cases deserve independent review, the justifications are two-fold.216  The 
first rests upon the extraordinary nature of the inducements given in this class of 
cases for testimony reaching the result supported by investigative and/or 
prosecutorial authorities.  This is “purchased” testimony from largely unreliable 
individuals.  The second is empirical.  Studies of cases of demonstrated innocence 
have shown that fabricated testimony by informants played a role in a substantial 
percentage of these miscarriages of justice.  The protections available to the 
prosecution—good motives, good judgment, and corroboration—all have limited 
effectiveness in ensuring such testimony is accurate, and they almost inevitably are 
dependent upon the reviewing authority’s subjective perception.  The least the 
system of justice should demand is a separate judgment beyond those in the midst 
of “the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”217  For those who 
would ask why other types of cases should not also be included, such as 
eyewitness identification cases, I do not argue against the reviews of other cases—
only that review is clearly necessary in the subclass of informant cases where the 
only direct evidence of guilt comes from the testimony of informants. 
 
A. Recording of “First Drafts” of the Informant’s Story 
 
For practical reasons, the first versions of some informant’s stories will not be 
available.  That may be because informers produce these “drafts” without the 
involvement of government agents or they are unwilling to have them recorded. 
I start with the easier case—jailhouse informants who approach government 
agents with information.  These prospective witnesses have singled themselves out.  
They are seeking favors.  They also do not risk self-incrimination from 
presentation of truthful information, as do co-participants.  From the very 
                                                                                                                                                   
215 See supra Part IV.C.4, which describes the command of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150 (1972), that inducements to informers must be revealed, and the impact of Napue v. Illinois, 360 
U.S. 264 (1959), which makes failure of prosecutors to reveal lies that they recognize their witnesses 
have told, including lies regarding the nature of the inducements, a violation of due process. 
216 These arguments are set out in supra Part IV. 
217 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (giving this as the justification for the 
bedrock principle that independent review by magistrates of a warrant is superior to reliance on the 
judgment of the police). 
 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 6:519 
 
566
beginning, the audio portion of all conversations with self-identified jailhouse 
informants seeking leniency should be mechanically recorded.218 
As to informants who have potential criminal liability, mechanical recording 
of initial conversations would clearly be preferable from the perspective of an 
accurate record.  However, I accept that such a requirement may be too much to 
ask for two reasons.  First, determining as to which conversations the requirement 
applied could be problematic.  Initial police contact with individuals who 
ultimately become informants often is indistinguishable from ordinary 
investigative conversations.  Strict compliance with a mechanical recording 
requirement for potential informants thus would require recording of large 
numbers of police conversations with suspects.  Mechanical recording may well be 
an appropriate general requirement for investigative conversations, but if so, it 
needs to be adopted in its own right rather than by indirection to satisfy the 
requirement of recording first drafts of conversations with potential informants.  
Second, requiring mechanical recording before the potential informant has 
broached the subject of cooperating or has made a positive response to a law 
enforcement suggestion of cooperation will be too threatening for some potential 
informants.  As a result, I refrain from proposing recording of initial conversations 
but only in recognition of that likely impact on effective law enforcement.  A 
mechanical recording of the very words of the informant is by far the preferable 
form for later evaluation of the truth of the informant’s ultimate allegations and as 
a potential guard against governmental manipulation.219  Because mechanical 
recording is far preferable to note taking, it should be required as soon as concern 
for effective law enforcement will allow. 
I begin with a clearly inferior requirement, but one that should be imposed 
without exception—the requirement that all law enforcement personnel and 
prosecutors prepare, retain, and produce substantially verbatim notes of their 
contacts with potential informants.220  I am here discussing contacts with 
prospective witnesses, who will also frequently be potential suspects.  Good police 
work should mandate careful recording of all statements of such individuals, and 
as a result, the needs of effective investigation are not compromised by this 
                                                                                                                                                   
218 By mechanical recording, I mean recording on audio or video tape.  I recognize that 
because of its potential for use in identifying informants if mishandled, videotaping may be avoided.  
I accept that losing the slight benefit of visual recording is outweighed by the resistance to such 
recording.  
219 The revelation of Virginia defense attorney Leslie P. Smith is instructive.  He revealed that 
in conversation with his client to secure his testimony, the prosecutor turned off the tape recording 
equipment when his client’s version of the facts did not mesh with the prosecution’s theory of the 
case and the physical evidence.  See Adam Liptak, Lawyer Reveals Secret, Toppling Death Sentence, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at A1. 
220 Concretely, the interviewer should be required to make a good faith effort to capture the 
conversation in detail in the original interview notes.  Also, destruction of those notes must be 
prohibited; the claim that they have been incorporated into typed compilations should be specifically 
rejected by the formal requirements of the rule requiring documentation and preservation of the “first 
drafts” of these conversations. 
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requirement.  All that I am proposing to add, which I recognize is a major change 
for many jurisdictions, are the requirements of retention of those notes and their 
production during discovery when the witness becomes identified as an informant.  
North Carolina’s newly enacted discovery rule requires the prosecution to 
“[m]ake available to the defendant the complete files of all law enforcement and 
prosecutorial agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the 
prosecution of the defendant.”221  The term “file” is broadly defined to include 
“witness statements, investigating officers’ notes, results of tests and examinations, 
or any other matter or evidence obtained during the investigation.”222  It mandates 
that “[o]ral statements shall be in written or recorded form.”223  Like the provision 
enacted earlier that was applicable to post-conviction litigation in North Carolina 
death penalty cases, this is “full open-file discovery” in the sense that the 
prosecution is responsible for providing the defense not only with the material that 
it has in its file, but also with material in law enforcement agency files.224 
Had such provisions been in effect in the Hunt case, the defense, and more 
importantly Hunt’s jury, could have seen the work of the inducements if Williford 
in his conversation with law enforcement officers in his lawyer’s office began with 
a version that inculpated only Cashwell.  The constancy or transformation of his 
testimony would have been available to support Hunt’s guilt in the former situation 
against defense attack or to win his acquittal in the latter.  Clues could also have 
been gained from the “early drafts” of the testimony of the jailhouse informants, 
Goodman and Thompson,225 and from the other alleged involved informant, West.  
If any of these stories changed significantly, the defense was constitutionally 
entitled to the alterations under the general obligation of the prosecution derived 
                                                                                                                                                   
221 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2007).  For a summary of its provisions, see John Rubin, 
2004 Legislation Affecting Criminal Law and Procedure, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BULL., Oct. 
2004, at 1, 2–8, available at http:/www.sog.unc.edu/programs/crimlaw/aoj200406.pdf. 
222 § 15A-903(a)(1). 
223 Id.  In State v. Shannon, 642 S.E.2d 516, 522–26 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007), the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals rejected the state’s argument for a narrow construction of the term “statement” and 
held that it applied, inter alia, to oral statements made by witnesses to prosecutors, which they are 
required to take down in written form and produce under the new discovery statute. 
224 In 2007, a provision was added that requires “[u]pon request by the State, a law 
enforcement or prosecutorial agency shall make available to the State a complete copy of the 
complete files related to the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant 
for compliance with [discovery requirements].”  15A-§ 903(c).  This statutory mandate gives force to 
the prosecution’s request for cooperation by investigative agency in making their files available to 
satisfy discovery requirements. 
225 Goodman’s first contact came in a conversation set up for other purposes and apparently 
without any record of the content of that conversation.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text.  
An early draft from Thompson, who wrote to the authorities, should have been available, see supra 
note 75 and accompanying text, but any intermediate transformations of his story were apparently 
not. 
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from Brady to provide evidence it possesses that impeaches its witnesses to the 
defense.226 
The constitutional entitlement, however, is subservient to the practicality of 
what documents are created and survive.  This means that unless recording is 
mandated many alterations will disappear under the combined operation of 
imperfect human memory and adversarial motivation.  The system that I advocate 
here is in many ways a radical change, but in some ways it is only what Hunt and 
the prosecution deserved from the beginning—an accurate record of the 
underpinnings of highly incentivized testimony.  Tragically, we may never know 
the truth, and as a result, Hunt, even if innocent, may die in prison because we 
cannot now know.  However, problematic informant testimony in many future 
cases can be avoided by the reforms proposed here.  
In all but a few states, the discovery obligations that were newly added to 
North Carolina law do not presently exist, and the legislatures may be unwilling to 
adopt such a major change applicable to all criminal cases.227  However, the 
dangers of informant testimony are so great that at least in this limited area a 
recording requirement should be imposed on both the prosecution and investigative 
agencies. 
I have purposefully chosen a statutory requirement imposed on the 
prosecutors and investigative authorities rather than a disciplinary rule focused on 
prosecutors because the latter is inadequate.  Bar ethics rules cannot in many 
situations reach police conduct, which is often the source of abuses, and if 
investigative agents are outside the reach of the law, misconduct may migrate here 
and effectively be hidden from both discovery and remedy. 
Mechanical recording should be required at the earliest point consistent with 
practicality.  It should be required as soon as a negotiation for cooperation begins, 
and in terms of clarity, that “trigger” is pulled as soon as either side broaches the 
subject.  However, I propose that a distinction should be made between when the 
suggestion of cooperation comes from the investigator rather than from the 
potential informant.  For the police simultaneously to suggest that the suspect 
cooperate and agree to have his or her conversation recorded is likely to 
threatening.  However, the situation changes when the prospective informant 
broaches the idea of cooperation.  Given the importance of mechanical verbatim 
recording for determining the truth, the indicated willingness of the witness to 
                                                                                                                                                   
226 The doctrine takes its name from Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and requires 
disclosure to the defense of evidence favorable to the accused, a duty that encompasses impeachment 
evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.  See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (citing 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985)).  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), 
discussed earlier, which requires the prosecutor to reveal information about its inducements to the 
informant, is a specific application of this general obligation to provide the defense with 
impeachment evidence. 
227 I have argued elsewhere, see generally Mosteller, supra note 2, that full open-file discovery 
should be adopted by all jurisdictions because of the inadequacy of constitutional and disciplinary 
remedies. 
2009] THE SPECIAL THREAT OF INFORMANTS  
 
569 
consider becoming an informant should be sufficient indication of practicality to 
impose the requirement that the investigative official turn on the recording 
equipment, that is if it is readily available.228  This requirement would mean that in 
virtually every case mechanical recording would be required when the prosecutor 
is involved in conversations with the informant that either develops the deal or 
recites the details of the informant’s future testimony.  
Under this proposal, the conversation in the Hunt case when Williford’s 
lawyer arranged for a meeting with authorities in the lawyer’s office and Williford 
provided some version of events would have been mechanically recorded.  We, 
and more importantly, the jury would have had data to determine the meaning of 
Williford’s cryptic statements regarding this discarded draft of his story.229   
I acknowledge a potentially large gap in the ability to obtain “first drafts” and 
to discern the development of perfected versions of the informant’s story.  When 
an attorney representing the informant is the source of the “first draft” or when that 
attorney assisted the informant in perfecting the version to be presented to the 
prosecution, getting such information will often be impossible.  The barrier to 
disclosure is the attorney-client privilege, which in rare situations would be 
waived,230 but will generally protect the earlier versions given by the client to his 
or her lawyer in confidence. 
Defense attorney Barry Tarlow argues that lawyers should be free to refuse to 
represent informers in arranging cooperation agreements.  In making that 
argument, Tarlow describes the defense attorney as being involved in the 
evolutionary process of the client transforming his or her testimony in response to 
subtle or overt suggestions by the investigative agent regarding what would be 
helpful testimony.231  He states that despite what he believes is a widespread 
practice defense attorneys do not routinely come forward and inform the court 
                                                                                                                                                   
228 If the equipment is not readily available, the requirement can be excused.  This exception is 
an obvious place for willful avoidance, but given the growing availability of such equipment and the 
recognition of the need to permit investigations to go forward in unforeseen situations, I believe such 
an accommodation is reasonable. 
229 See supra note 145 and accompany text (stating “I didn’t implication [sic] what I should 
have.”).  
230 Although the conversation was not obtained by Hunt’s lawyer at his trial, Williford’s 
testimony during the Cashwell trial may well have been the rare instance of waiving attorney-client 
privilege.  Williford continually invoked his lawyer’s advice as a justification for his cooperation.  He 
went further during his direct testimony in the Cashwell trial and indicated that he had told his lawyer 
about the details of the crime, using that statement to buttress the details and truthfulness of the 
version he gave to the court.  See Cashwell Tr., supra note 40, at 45–46 (responding to the 
prosecutor’s question whether he discussed his personal knowledge or involvement in the relevant 
events with any person, Williford testified that he talked to a friend and “I did discuss this with my 
lawyer”).  He thus disclosed not only the fact of a conversation but effectively asserted the general 
nature of the contents.  The attorney-client privilege should have been waived. 
231 See Barry Tarlow, RICO Report: The Moral Conundrum of Representing the Rat, 
CHAMPION, Mar. 2006, at 64, 65. 
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about this disturbing activity.232  He argues correctly, I believe, that the defense 
attorney cannot breach the attorney-client privilege as to prior inconsistent 
statements, and, moreover, even non-privileged revelation would be counter to the 
client’s legal interests.233 
When the attorney and client meet with the prosecutor and/or investigative 
agents, the privilege clearly does not exist because the presence of “outsiders” 
renders the conversation not confidential.234  Thus, those conversations are not 
protected and the lawyer may be a witness.235  Where a client’s version has been 
finalized for presentation to the prosecutor, it would arguably also not be 
privileged because it is for the purpose of disclosure and therefore not intended to 
remain confidential.  However, the initial version given to the attorney with no 
thought of disclosure would not be available, as well as some and perhaps all the 
“rough drafts” that were discarded and were not intended to be disclosed.236 
                                                                                                                                                   
232 Id.  Indeed, Tarlow stated he could find no reported case of such a disclosure.  Id.  Despite 
the general accuracy of Tarlow’s point, there is a recent exception.  In 2007, Virginia attorney Leslie 
P. Smith revealed that he had witnessed the prosecutor’s manipulation of his client’s story to match 
the physical evidence and confirm that the co-defendant, Daryl R. Atkins, fired the fatal shots.  See 
Liptak, supra note 219, at A1.  Atkins’ identity as the person who fired the fatal shot was critical to 
securing a death sentence under Virginia law.  Id.  After attorney Smith kept his secret for ten years 
under the advice he received from the Virginia State Bar when he initially inquired about his ethical 
duties to his client, Smith inquired again of the Bar, emphasizing that his client’s case was over.  In a 
statement that the Bar attorney would only provide orally, this time Smith was authorized to reveal 
his observations, and Atkins’ death sentence was commuted to life in prison.  Id. 
Under the duty of candor to the tribunal, the defense attorney is not generally ethically 
obligated to disclose information that contradicts representations made in court by a prosecution 
witness.  This is because the defense attorney is not offering the testimony; the prosecutor is.  See 
N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT  R. 3.3 (2003). 
233 See Tarlow, supra note 231, at 65.  See also Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 
OHIO ST. L.J. 69 (1995) (describing the generally precarious position of defense attorneys involved in 
negotiations between a cooperating witness and the government). 
234 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 91 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). 
235 In a recent North Carolina death penalty case that was reversed because of the failure to 
disclose the full nature of the incentives given to the informant, the defense attorney provided 
information on the full nature of the promises, although the trial court relied only on matters of record 
that occurred in federal proceedings involving the informant to grant relief.  See Mosteller, supra note 
2, at 276–84 (describing criminal litigation in the Gregory Hoffman case and disciplinary 
proceedings against the prosecutors in the case and, as to the latter, the important role of an affidavit 
from the defense attorney for the informant setting out the additional undisclosed promises made to 
the informant). 
236 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 234, § 91, at 409 (arguing that the privilege 
ought to protect preliminary conversations and draft wording regarding documents intended to be 
disclosed in a final form); In re Stoutamire, 201 B.R. 592, 595–96 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996) 
(concluding that the attorney-client privilege covered the initial intake interview even though parts of 
that communication were intended to go onto a public disclosure, which is not privileged because 
intended ultimately to be given to a third party).  But see 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra § 91, at 
408–09 (discussing the split in case law on this subject, which includes some cases that would 
disclose preliminary conversations about, and drafts of, documents that are to be given to third 
parties). 
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B. Public Statement and Examination of the Deal 
 
One problem that is often encountered where informants testify is the failure 
of the prosecution to provide full evidence on the nature of the promises made and 
inducements given, particularly vague promises and inducements.  That defect did 
not arise in the Hunt case; the inducements for the informants were both 
substantial and made explicit in written form.  Because of the difficulty years after 
a trial of discovering undisclosed inducements and because of the dangers that 
deals will be hidden or disguised by their imprecision, the law should require that 
witnesses who are testifying under inducements state on the record the nature and 
extent of the inducements they have received and expect to receive before they 
testify. 
To help alleviate this all too common problem of a failure of full disclosure, 
Professor Cassidy has helpfully argued for a written agreement and a hearing at the 
time of entry of a guilty plea to establish the expectations of leniency of the person 
entering the plea.237  I suggest modifying and extending Cassidy’s proposal. 
The need is illustrated by the conviction and death sentence given to Joseph 
Hoffman in Union County, North Carolina, which was reversed after a Giglio 
violation was unearthed through the hard work of post-conviction counsel.238  
There, according to the affidavit of defense counsel who was present, a series of 
explicit promises were made to the witness, but all but one were to be carried out 
after the informant’s testimony and/or by others than the prosecutor who was 
appearing in court to prosecute Hoffman.239  Thus, proving the actual promise was 
difficult, and as Cassidy points out, the fact that a later benefit is bestowed does 
not necessarily prove that an earlier promise was made.240 
Two types of disclosures should be required.  The first is a written statement, 
mandated in all cases where witnesses testify under inducements, signed by the 
prosecutor and signed and sworn to by the informant that details the promises 
made and inducements received.  The document should recite that it includes all 
promises and inducements made by any law enforcement personnel, any 
prosecutor, and any other government agent in all jurisdictions.  This 
comprehensive informant inducement document should pointedly also ask for a 
listing of both definite promises and suggested possibilities.241  It should also state 
                                                                                                                                                   
237 See supra notes 209–11 and accompanying text.  ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: 
Prosecutorial Investigations 2.5(h) (2008), 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pinvestigate.html, states that the prosecutor should reduce a 
cooperation agreement to writing and should include in it, in addition to “details of all benefits and 
obligations agreed upon,” “a complete list of any other promises, financial benefits or 
understandings.” 
238 See Mosteller, supra note 2, at 276–84. 
239 Id. at 278–81. 
240 See Cassidy, supra note 200, at 1160–61. 
241 Requiring this consolidated document could well encourage prosecutor offices across 
jurisdictions and levels of government to create an information sharing system regarding inducements 
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that absent extraordinary circumstances, rewards not noted on the form or reflected 
as possibilities would be assumed to demonstrate that the disclosure was 
incomplete and therefore false and would therefore likely expose the informant to 
prosecution. 
Second, a pre-testimony hearing should also be mandated where the court 
would inquire of both the informant under oath and of the prosecution as to the 
accuracy of the inducement document.  The hearing should also include questions 
designed to expose any uncertainties that the informant might have or additional 
inducements that might not have been included on the form, which would most 
likely have been prepared by the prosecutor’s office rather than the informer.  This 
proceeding could virtually put an end to the retrospective inquiry of what promises 
were made, which is often now undertaken years after the events when memories 
have dimmed and proof of other promises is more likely unavailable.  
Together, the inducement form and the hearing regarding the inducements 
could also help eliminate intentionally hidden promises, and might even do so as a 
matter of law.  I propose that the court conducting the hearing state to the witness 
and all those present that all promises and inducements whether explicit or implicit 
must be put on the record because if they are not they will be considered invalid 
and unenforceable. 
With only a little effort, courts could develop a standard inquiry that would 
focus on frequently omitted inducements.  For example, does the informant know 
of any financial reward and does he or she have expectations of receiving it?; do or 
did the informant have cases in other courts or jurisdictions that received or may 
need attention?; have police officers other than the prosecutor discussed helping 
the informant?  The court should also state that if any undisclosed inducements are 
later discovered the witness may be prosecuted for perjury, and all those who were 
aware of the failure to disclose may be subject to other forms of discipline.  The 
hearing would establish a firm record, and it would announce to all present to 
“speak now or forever hold your peace” about promises and inducements.  If 
witnesses were disappointed about the failure of those on the prosecution side to 
step forward and announce or support publicly what had been suggested, then 
perhaps the witness would be less complete in his or her anticipated incriminating 
testimony, and a non-legal remedy would thereby be imposed on the prosecution 
for its omissions. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
given to informants and require law enforcement agencies to participate.  Cf. Mosteller, supra note 2, 
at 272–76 (describing how the North Carolina legislature required law enforcement and prosecutorial 
agencies to make their files available to the State for compliance with the new discovery law that 
requires full disclosure of not only prosecution files but of other investigative agencies).  I cannot 
ascribe percentages to the different causes for past failures to disclose all inducements, but many of 
them no doubt arose not from purposeful withholding of information but from a lack of full 
information in the hands of the prosecutor making representations to the court.   
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C. An Independent Review Whenever Informant Testimony Provides the Only 
Direct Evidence of Guilt 
 
The concept of a thorough review when jailhouse informants provide the 
exclusive evidence for conviction has been advocated by many; indeed, even more 
is often proposed.  When a review is suggested, it is often described in detail.242  
What I propose instead is broader and less specific.  It is that in every case where 
informant testimony of whatever type provides the only direct evidence of guilt 
every prosecutor’s office, large or small, have an established procedure for an 
independent review of the merits of the prosecution.243  
I make the assumption that the effectiveness of this inquiry depends less on 
the specification of the issues to examine than on the integrity and independence of 
those conducting it.  I have written before about both the unenforceability of the 
prosecutor’s duty to “do justice” and the critical importance of having that duty 
carried out by conscientious prosecutors.244  Despite the unenforceability of this 
amorphous responsibility on review, I firmly believe in its great power when 
exercised by skilled prosecutors acting with good will. 
However, neutrality or at least some separation from the competitiveness of 
the immediate adversary process is required for the review to be meaningful and 
effective.  Noting that “[p]rosecutors who investigate a case are poorly positioned 
to make a final assessment of guilt because they cannot view the facts 
impartially,”245 Professor Rachel Barkow argues that roles within a prosecutor’s 
office should be separated with the investigative or prosecutorial duties kept apart 
from those that are fundamentally adjudicative.246  This proposal shares that basic 
insight that neutral evaluation is almost inherently incompatible with direct 
investigative and prosecutorial duties and applies it to the ultimate adjudicative 
decision within the prosecutor’s office—the decision to terminate proceedings 
against a person targeted for trial.  Each prosecutor’s office should be required to 
                                                                                                                                                   
242 See supra note 182 (discussing the protocol developed for Ontario, Canada). 
243 As with independent prosecutorial review of substantial claims of innocence discussed in 
the next proposal, I believe that independent review may be appropriate for other discrete, 
identifiable classes of cases where the dangers of false convictions has been documented, such as 
uncorroborated single witness identification cases.  However, the focus of this article is on the grave 
dangers of informant-dependent convictions for which often the only meaningful control is careful 
review by experienced professionals motivated to independently evaluate the evidence. 
244 See Mosteller, supra note 1, at 1365 (noting the critical importance of the prosecutor’s duty 
to do justice, even though practically unenforceable, as an aspirational goal in our criminal justice 
system); id. at 1372 (recognizing general importance of goal). 
245 Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 883 (2009).  Cf. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative 
System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117 (1998) (arguing that operating system of 
criminal justice places prosecutors effectively in an administrative role as they assess evidence and 
judge criminal responsibility).  
246 Barkow, supra note 245, at 896. 
 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 6:519 
 
574
set up such a mechanism for review by personnel from outside the involved 
prosecutor’s office. 
The circumstances in North Carolina illustrate what is clearly possible and 
what would be important.  The state has three natural geographic divisions.  
Review teams could be organized from senior prosecutors in each region.  Of 
course, the review team for a particular case would not include members of the 
prosecutor’s office being reviewed. 
In North Carolina, a senior prosecutor, Tom Keith, of Winston-Salem has 
been called upon to handle a similar duty.  When serious questions were raised 
about the guilt of James Johnson in a murder in another part of the state, the 
Administrative Office of the North Carolina Courts asked his office for help, and a 
senior prosecutor from that office was appointed as special prosecutor.247  That 
prosecutor determined that the murder charge was not warranted, and it was 
dismissed.248 
A system should be put in place by each state to handle these reviews.  Many 
different designs are possible, such as the regional approach described above, 
drawing review members for local prosecutions from the state’s attorney general’s 
office, or perhaps taking them from a national organization of prosecutors.  
Independence is critical and so is a willingness to take the possibility of innocence 
seriously.  Selecting the review members from the ranks of seasoned prosecutors 
may appear to bias the outcome in favor of denying relief to the accused.  That is 
undeniably true.  My sense, however, is that going outside the prosecutorial fold 
would mean that the review would rarely be done voluntarily, and given the virtual 
absolute control that local prosecutors have on decisions in most jurisdictions, the 
result of the inquiry must be one that will be respected, which is most likely if the 
judgment of the group performing the review is readily accepted by the prosecutor 
who exercises ultimate control over the case. 
 
D. Official Prosecutorial Inquiry into Substantial Claims of Innocence in Cases 
Dependent on Informants 
 
Early in this essay, I discussed my disappointment with the North Carolina 
appellate courts in failing to review the Lee Wayne Hunt case generally and 
                                                                                                                                                   
247 See Patrick Wilson, Accused to Be at Two Local Churches: Review of Disputed Charges 
Nearly Done, WINSTON-SALEM J., Dec. 16, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 24830384.  One reason 
District Attorney Keith may have been selected was his own involvement with the case of an 
innocent defendant, Darryl Hunt, who was convicted of rape and murder and spent eighteen years in 
prison before being exonerated.  See supra note 160 (discussing Hunt case).  For years, Keith fought 
Hunt’s appeals until he finally conceded that DNA proved Hunt had not committed the rape and 
murder of which he had been convicted.  See Patrick Wilson, Justice Deferred?: Advocates Say 
Projects Looking at Inmate Claims of Innocence Are Meeting Resistance, WINSTON-SALEM J., Dec. 
23, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 25319624.  The experience did not make Keith necessarily easy 
to persuade, but it did give him the insight that serious mistakes are made.  See id. 
248 See Titan Barksdale, Murder Charges Dropped in Wilson, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), 
Dec. 20, 2007, at A1. 
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particularly the failing to give guidance on the dimensions of the attorney-client 
privilege for deceased clients who conveyed information to their attorneys that 
exculpated others.  I here also reiterate my disappointment with the response of the 
North Carolina Attorney General’s Office to Staples Hughes’ revelation. 
I can find no evidence that the Attorney General’s Office took the possibility 
of Hunt’s innocence seriously.249  For example, it made no effort to meet with 
Staples Hughes face-to-face to attempt to determine whether his claims were 
partisan and easily refuted or firmly held and substantial.  I cannot find anything in 
the record that should have kept the Attorney General and his staff from 
entertaining the possibility that Hunt was innocent of the murders of Roland and 
Lisa Matthews. 
In general, to ensure a careful, critical, and equivalent response across cases, 
the Attorney General’s Office or other authority charged with handling issues that 
arise in cases after conviction should establish an internal system that looks at 
cases independently and freshly when substantial claims of innocence are raised.  
This should be an accepted part of the justice process that would help ensure public 
confidence and aid in securing a more timely remedy for injustice. 
An office with this broad mandate should be established.250  However, the 
focus of this article is more narrowly on abuses by informants and their correction.  
My specific proposal concerns informant-dependent convictions and requires 
substantial allegations of innocence: In cases where the only direct evidence of 
guilt comes from informants, a prosecutorial agency independent of the office that 
secured the conviction should be charged with the duty of conducting further 
investigation into facially credible fact-based claims if those claims would create a 
reasonable likelihood of innocence if true. 
 In February 2008, the ABA’s House of Delegates approved changes to Rule 
3.8 of its Model Rules of Professional Conduct that require the prosecutor to 
investigate innocence if the prosecutor “knows of new, credible and material 
evidence creating a reasonable likelihood” of the innocence of a convicted 
defendant and seek to remedy the conviction when the prosecutor “knows of clear 
and convincing evidence establishing that” the convicted defendant is innocent.251  
                                                                                                                                                   
249 As noted earlier, see supra note 101, the Attorney General’s Office, rather than local 
prosecutors, were in charge of the initial prosecution of Hunt.  The lack of independence from trial 
decisions to rely on the informants may have been a reason the reaction to the new evidence from 
Staples Hughes by the Attorney General’s Office did not appear to trigger a vigorous new evaluation 
of the case but instead produced suggestions of professional impropriety against Hughes, opposition 
to any consideration of Cashwell’s statement, and threatened prosecution for perjury for informant 
Kenneth West if he were to testify.  See Transcript of Hearing on Hunt MAR, supra note 87, at 66 
(defense attorney for West stating that he understood if West testified to anything different than in his 
plea transcript the State would charge him with perjury, which could make him eligible for enhanced 
punishment as a habitual offender). 
250 See supra note 243 (discussing general need for pre-trial mechanism for independent 
review of other identifiable questionable categories of convictions). 
251 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g)-(h) (adopted Feb. 11, 2008). 
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The proposed disciplinary rule requires action upon the prosecutor acquiring the 
prescribed levels of actual knowledge of innocence.252  My proposal builds on that 
ethical duty and adopts the logical next step that the prosecution should have the 
duty to conduct an inquiry when it does not yet “know” but is presented with 
facially credible claims that are subject to verification that if established would 
give rise to an ethical duty to proceed further, e.g., would create a reasonable 
likelihood of innocence if verified.253  And under that standard, the information 
provided by Staples Hughes in his affidavit would clearly require the 
commencement of the prosecutor’s internal investigation and evaluation rather 
than an apparently uncritical and certainly unrestrained defense of the conviction. 
Mistakes can be made in difficult cases by honorable and talented 
prosecutors.  Establishing a process that allows such mistakes to be recognized and 
remedied adds to the strength of our system.  Independent Innocence Commissions 
are important.  In some cases, however, their role should become unnecessary 
                                                                                                                                                   
252 As Professors Green and Yaroshefsky persuasively argue, the Model Rule should be 
understood to establish minimum standards both for prosecution investigation and disclosure of 
information and for prosecutorial efforts to secure the release of an incarcerated defendant.  See 
Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Adjudicating Innocence: Prosecutorial Discretion After 
Conviction, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467 (2009). 
253 The ABA disciplinary rule requires action only when the prosecutor acquires the prescribed 
level of actual knowledge of innocence.  My broader proposal is that those responsible for the post-
conviction defense of cases should create an agency that is generally available to examine innocence 
claims.  A pre-existing structure should exist to facilitate the acquisition and evaluation of evidence 
of innocence when a substantial claim is made or when the prosecution itself discovers some 
evidence suggesting the possibility of error.  The inquiry may be conducted in a broader array of 
cases confidentially and out of public view, but institutionalizing receptivity to the idea that errors do 
occur is itself important. 
This proposal builds on the ABA ethics rules but would operate in many cases before the 
ethical duty to proceed to a full investigation would arise and certainly before there is a duty to join 
the defense in seeking relief.  Sufficient proof of innocence to create a prosecutorial duty to act under 
the new ethics rule may come to the prosecutor in a single discovery or revelation.  Also, it may come 
from sources internal to the prosecution that are assumed, if not worthy of belief, at least worthy of 
further inquiry.  In other cases, the initial revelation or discovery may be incomplete and a process of 
evaluation and further investigation would be required to meet the ABA’s stated threshold level for 
investigation.  In such cases, I propose that the prosecution has a duty to conduct at least a 
preliminary inquiry to determine whether claims hold up. 
The allegations in Hunt case are in this last category.  The major claim came from a source 
outside the prosecution that might typically be discounted because of presumed adversarial bias.  My 
proposal is to create a structure within the prosecutorial branch that is independent of those who 
secured the conviction and is receptive to correcting possible injustice when substantial, potentially 
credible fact-based allegations of innocence are made even if not yet clearly based on credible 
evidence.  This entity should have the duty to look independently and fairly into an allegation such as 
that from Staples Hughes to judge neutrally whether it creates the required level under the ABA’s 
proposal to warrant full-scale investigation. 
Facially incredible claims can be ignored.  I use the term fact-based allegation to connote a 
claim that is subject to possible verification.  Obviously, theoretical claims of innocence are possible 
in most situations.  The prosecution need not conduct an investigation on claims that are unverifiable.  
On the other hand, formal proof or even a sworn proffer may not be available from witnesses and 
should not be required. 
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when a fresh set of prosecutorial eyes look at new facts and rectify an 
understandable but still unfortunate error in justice. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Dangers abound when the target in a specific case is one of  the “usual 
suspects whether the evidence under consideration is “other crimes” evidence, 
which largely proves character, a co-conspirator statement, or the testimony of an 
informant.  The dangers are particularly great and errors especially difficult to 
discern when the prosecution has already targeted the defendant and presumed his 
guilt as the perpetrator because of the suspect’s real or assumed involvement in 
criminal acts.  Informants, both jailhouse informants and those who are more 
plausibly credible because they are the target’s criminal associates  and  
presumably directly involved in the crime, often provide critical testimony.  They 
are more likely to step forward because the authorities can put pressure on a group 
of the defendant’s associates who have committed crimes and therefore have 
exposure to punishment.  Even though these individuals may lack the ordinary 
credibility of the typical witness, in comparison with the accused and testifying in 
the face of the assumed menace of a crime kingpin, they stand a reasonable chance 
of being believed despite their obvious incentives to distort the evidence.  
Moreover, law enforcement officials and prosecutors honorably trying to do their 
job to protect the community, who would generally follow an ethical path, are 
more likely to turn a blind eye to cutting ethical corners in cases involving known 
criminals.  Their understandable justification is that they are “doing justice,” but 
doing so in a real world inhabited by criminals, like the suspect, who do not exhibit 
such honor. 
Those falsely accused in the Duke Lacrosse Case ultimately received the just 
exoneration they deserved.  They were fortunate that circumstances made it 
difficult for the victim’s erroneous accusation to be buttressed by witnesses who 
would benefit by aiding a prosecutor who was intent upon securing a conviction.  
Lee Wayne Hunt’s case provides the counter-point.  His situation was ripe for 
informants to step forward and develop a version of events that not only included 
fingering the actual murderer, but took along with him the reputed head of a drug 
distribution ring.   
It is time for every jurisdiction, not only those which have experienced 
disastrous cases of demonstrated injustice involving informants, to act to lessen the 
problem.  I propose four reforms.  The first is to create recording and discovery 
requirements that go beyond ethical mandates and as a matter of statutory law 
require the production of the initial versions of facts provided by informants to 
authorities.  In order for there to be disclosure at trial, laws must mandate 
substantially verbatim recording the dates of contact and the content of 
conversations with informants and require that such information be preserved.  
Broad discovery provisions regarding such contacts and statements are also 
necessary.  Because much of the work with informants, particularly the early, often 
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critical contact, is done by investigative authorities rather than prosecutors, 
disciplinary rules, which can be important supplements, but apply only to 
prosecutors, are not sufficient.  This is the minimum set of requirements that 
should be imposed.  Notes are frequently inadequate and subject to easy omission.  
Consistent with the needs of effective investigation, mechanical recording should 
be required of all jailhouse informants who contact the authorities and offer 
assistance, and mechanical recording should be required for all informant 
conversations as soon as the informant raises the subject of receiving benefits for 
cooperation. 
A second proposal is to require that a document be prepared and a hearing be 
held before the informant testifies to establish on the record what inducements the 
prosecution offered and the informant’s expectations.  This information is 
constitutionally required under Giglio.  The United States Supreme Court has not 
required soliciting and recording the information beforehand, but legislatures 
should fulfill their appropriate role as drafters of criminal procedure rules and 
require such documentation of this constitutionally required information.  History 
has shown that, even with good faith efforts, multiple actors involved in the 
process lead to inadequate disclosure and false testimony, a situation that cannot be 
effectively remedied by happenstance discovery by defense lawyers and/or 
occasional post-conviction proceedings where years after the relevant events an 
effort is made to establish that failures to disclose inducements occurred. 
Third, all prosecutors’ offices, whether large or small, should set up a review 
process for any case where the only direct proof of guilt comes from informant 
testimony.  Good models exist for jurisdictions willing to undertake extensive 
reviews,254 but demanding such an exacting procedure likely dooms the proposal 
as unrealistic.  In the end, I believe the key to any review is not its detail, but the 
fact of undertaking a real review by “an independent set of eyes.”  Requiring a 
review procedure is not an onerous mandate.  It is reasonable to require a real 
focus on whether guilt is shown independently of the expectation that the charged 
individual did the crime and the claims of highly motivated informants.  If actually 
conducted, such review should uncover and correct some errors before they result 
in the conviction of someone innocent of the charged crime. 
Finally, when a conviction for which the only direct evidence of guilt comes 
from informants is called into question by a substantial and potentially verifiable 
claim of innocence, each state should have an independent process within their 
attorney general’s office to review the case with “an independent set of eyes.”  
Holding this review should be without any negative consequence for the State: it 
should not in any way be considered by the fact finder as evidence that the 
prosecution doubted the merits of its case.  However, its conduct should be 
regarded by the public as a reason for confidence that justice has been done in the 
case. 
                                                                                                                                                   
254 See the description of the Ontario, Canada, procedure discussed in supra note 182. 
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These last two proposals depend on the prosecution honoring its duty to “do 
justice” and on a careful exercise of discretion.  They can be done by prosecutors 
who are fully committed to the goal of convicting the guilty, but they are done best 
by prosecutors who are independent of the particular prosecution and the personal 
commitment to guilt that such involvement often creates.  Giving a suspect who is 
a known bad actor such independent review is asking a great deal, but our 
commitment to justice must be not only strong but specific.  It requires proof of 
guilt in the particular case and a demonstration of rectitude against the potential of 
treachery by informants. 
